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Abstract 
 
Retirees with limited financial resources face numerous risks, including out-living their 
money (longevity risk), investment losses (market risk), unexpected health expenses 
(health risk), the unforeseen needs of family members (family risk), and even retirement 
benefit cuts (policy risk).  This study systematically values and ranks the financial 
impacts of these risks from both the objective and subjective perspectives and then 
compares them to show the gaps between retirees’ actual risks and their perceptions of 
the risks in a unified framework.  It finds that 1) under the empirical analysis, the greatest 
risk is longevity risk, followed by health risk; 2) under the subjective analysis, retirees 
perceive market risk as the highest-ranking risk due to their exaggeration of market 
volatility; and 3) the longevity risk and health risk are valued less in the subjective 
ranking than in the objective ranking, because retirees underestimate their life spans and 
their health costs in late life.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Managing resources in retirement has always been challenging, particularly for retirees 
with limited financial resources, because they face numerous risks.  Moreover, 
fundamental changes that have occurred in recent decades have made it increasingly 
difficult for individuals to plan and manage their retirement resources effectively (GAO, 
2017).  For example: 1) the increase in longevity raises the risk of outliving retirement 
savings; 2) a marked shift by employers away from traditional defined benefit pension 
plans to defined contribution plans, such as 401(k)s and Individual Retirement Accounts 
(IRAs), has increased the risks and responsibilities in planning and managing retirement 
spending; 3) the high and rapidly rising cost of health care, especially long-term care in 
later life, further complicates retirement planning; and 4) Social Security benefits – the 
primary retirement income source for the majority of retirees – would be reduced by 
about 25 percent under current law if Congress takes no action before 2035 when the 
trust fund reserves are projected to be exhausted (SSA, 2019).  Therefore, it is valuable to 
identify and quantify the retirement risks to better understand the challenges facing 
retirees. 
 
The empirical literature has separately addressed the various sources of retirement risk 
and their impacts on retirement security, including out-living one’s money (longevity 
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risk), investment losses (market risk), unexpected health expenses (health risk), the 
unforeseen needs of family members (family risk), and even retirement benefit cuts 
(policy risk).  Because these sources of risk are distributed along multiple dimensions, 
including a retiree’s time horizon (longevity risk), savings levels (market risk), benefit 
receipt (policy risk), and money paid out of pocket for expenses (health risk and family 
risk), it is necessary to quantify and rank these risks using appropriate measures under a 
unified framework.  
 
In addition to the objective risks, retirees must make decisions based on their beliefs 
about future events, which are represented by subjective risk distributions.  These beliefs 
often deviate from the distributions in the empirical data, and they are central to 
understanding retirees’ choices and outcomes (Manski 2004).  Therefore, a comparison 
of the subjective and objective risks is crucial, because: 1) a complete overview of both 
types of risk can inform public policies that improve retirement security; and 2) the gaps 
between the perceived and actual risks shed light on the ways to improve private financial 
products. 
 
To fill the gap in the literature, this study measures various sources of retirement risk 
from both the objective and subjective perspectives and will attempt to answer the 
following two questions: 1) what is the ranking of each of the various retirement risks for 
a typical household, based on the empirical data? and 2) do people perceive their risks 
accurately?  In other words, do retirees’ expectations of their future risks follow the same 
rank order as the empirical ranking of risk?  To compare the objective and subjective 
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risks, this study systematically values and ranks the financial impact of retirement risks 
using the method of utility-equivalent wealth (i.e., the wealth compensation for a certain 
risk). This analysis has three steps.   
 
The first step is to build a life-cycle optimization model that includes all the sources of 
risk, using the empirical distributions as inputs.  A typical retired household holds limited 
resources, such as retirement savings and housing wealth, both of which are measured by 
the survey data.  The household in this model faces five categories or risk: 1) mortality or 
longevity risk, meaning that the retiree may either die young without consuming all of the 
wealth or live longer than expected after exhausting all the money; 2) market risk, such as 
bad stock returns or a decline in housing values; 3) health risk, defined as unexpected 
medical expenses and long-term care needs; 4) family risk, including the death of a 
spouse or the unforeseen needs of family members, such as providing financial aid to 
adult children; and 5) policy risk, mainly a Social Security benefit cut.  Building a life 
cycle model results in an optimized function indicating how much a typical retired 
household can consume and invest over the life cycle to optimize resource use and an 
expected lifetime utility associated with the household’s optimized profile.  The lifetime 
utility serves as the benchmark in the objective model to compare with the alternative in 
the next step. 
 
The second step is to quantify each source of objective risk by solving the optimization 
model repeatedly by removing one risk source at a time.  After each risk source is 
removed and estimated, it is returned to the optimization model, and the procedure is 
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repeated for the next risk.  For example, the health risk is removed by fixing the medical 
expenditures at the average level in place of a random shock every year.  The result of 
removing one objective risk is that a risk-averse retiree would need less initial retirement 
wealth to reach the same lifetime utility level as in the objective benchmark. This wealth 
decrease represents the financial impact and thus quantifies the economic value of the 
risk.  A similar procedure is used for all the other risks.  In this way, each objective risk is 
properly valued and ranked under their respective risk distributions. 
 
Given the discrepancy between the empirical risk distribution and the subjective risk 
expectation due to limited financial literacy or personal biases, the last step of this study 
is to repeat the exercise above using the subjective risk distributions calibrated from the 
survey data instead of empirical data.  As a result, this study produces two sets of 
rankings that can be compared: objective and subjective. When the objective risk levels 
are ranked, the result shows that longevity risk ranks at the top of the list, followed by 
health risk and market risk.  Policy risk is last because Social Security reform is unlikely 
to have a significant impact on people who have already retired. However, market risk is 
first in the subjective ranking because retirees exaggerate financial market volatility.  
Longevity risk and health risk are valued as less important in the subjective ranking than 
in objective ranking, due to the retiree’s underestimation of their longevity – “survival 
pessimism” – and the underestimation of health expenditures late in life.  
 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the 
literature on the various sources of retirement risk and describes the gaps between 
	 5	
empirical studies and subjective perceptions.  Chapter 2 describes the data with summary 
statistics. Chapter 3 introduces the life cycle structural model and details how these 
sources of risk fit in. Chapter 4 shows the results, from both the objective and subjective 
perspectives. Chapter 5 concludes and discusses future research in this area. 
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1 LITERATURE 
The literature on retirement risk so far has consisted of two lines of research.  The first is 
the overall retirement risk level, i.e., whether retirees are adequately prepared to meet the 
costs of retirement life.  For example, the most recent National Retirement Risk Index 
shows that half of today’s working households in the United States will not be able to 
maintain their standard of living in the retirement (Munnell, Hou, and Sanzenbacher 
2018), a finding that is consistent with many studies (Vernon 2018).1  In this line of 
research, the standard measurement is the so-called replacement rate, which is the ratio of 
post-retirement income to pre-retirement income for each household.  Whether a 
household is at risk is normally determined by comparing the replacement rate with a 
target replacement rate that is deemed to be adequate for retirees to meet their basic 
needs.2  This measurement is intuitive and easily understood by a general audience and 
straightforward to apply in practice.  However, it has two flaws: 1) as a static index, it 
normally projects the future with expected means and thus ignores the variance, i.e., 
future uncertainties such as health shocks and market volatility; and 2) it cannot be 
broken down by various sources of risk.3 
 
	
1 Vernon (2018) finds that various studies show roughly half of all older American workers not having 
adequate retirement savings for retirement.   
2 The income data in the calculation typically come from surveys, administrative records, or model 
projections. 
3 The SOA (2018) discusses various replacement rate models in the literature, and lists other problems such 
as no universal way to measure both the numerator and denominator, and no agreed-upon definition of 
what constitutes an “adequate”. 
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The second line of research takes a closer look at retirement risk through two channels: 1) 
identifying various sources of the risk; and 2) exploring their magnitudes and how to 
manage them.  The risks are often identified through qualitative surveys.  For example, 
the 2017 Risks and Process of Retirement Survey by the Society of Actuaries (SOA) 
evaluates Americans’ retirement preparedness and highlights the leading concerns, such 
as health care affordability, nursing home or long-term care expenditures, and whether 
savings keeps up with inflation.  In other studies, uncertainties such as major downturns 
in the stock market and changes to the Social Security program are frequently addressed.4  
The qualitative studies contribute to the literature by sketching the contours of the risk 
facing retirees.  In order to answer the questions of how big the risks are and how they 
can be managed, a quantitative model is often required that uses risk distributions from 
the empirical data.  However, most studies are limited to one or two sources of risk. 
Furthermore, due to the limited financial knowledge or personal biases, it is not easy for 
people to accurately understand their retirement risks.5  Thanks to improvements in 
survey data, recent research pays more attention to the deviation of subjective risk 
expectations from the empirical risk distributions and its consequences to retirement 
planning and retirement security.  The rest of this section summarizes five major risk 
sources that have been identified in the literature.  
	
4 For example, see 2018 Prudential Retirement Preparedness Survey and 2018 MassMutual Retirement 
Savings Risk Study. 
5 In fact, Munnell, Hou, and Sanzenbacher (2017) show that only half of people correctly understanding 
whether they have enough resources for their retirement. 
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1.1 Longevity Risk 
Longevity risk is possibly one of the largest and least understood retirement risks 
(Crawford, Haan, and Runchey 2008).  It was studied as early as Yaari (1965) who 
introduced the concept of the unsolved annuity puzzle.6  Later research, in recognition of 
the enormous impact of longevity risk, often includes it as a fundamental element in 
quantitative models (e.g., Cocco and Gomes, 2012).  Those studies often focus on solving 
the annuity puzzle (e.g., Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond 2005) or evaluating retirement 
income strategies (e.g, Sun and Webb 2012).  In terms of putting an economic value on 
longevity risk, a seminal paper by Mitchell et al. (1999) finds that a typical retiree would 
accept a wealth reduction of more than 30 percent if the longevity risk could be hedged 
by annuities.7  A recent paper by Milevsky and Young (2018) studies the value of 
longevity risk pooling and finds a similar result.  These studies either use empirical 
mortality data such as life tables for the general population or annuitants or estimate 
parametric mortality models based on demographics.  However, recent literature argues 
that a subjective survival probability is more appropriate in the context of a rational agent 
making decisions, because it influences behavior and welfare outcomes (e.g., Griffin, 
Hesketh, and Loh 2012; van Solinge and Henkens 2010).  For example, O’Dea and 
Sturrock (2018) find significant “survival pessimism,” on average, and Bissonnette et al. 
(2017) calculate a 7-percent welfare loss if a subjective survival probability is used in the 
decision-making process.8   	
6 A well-known prediction of the standard life-cycle model is that in the presence of lifespan uncertainty, 
people should invest in nothing but annuities. 
7 Their model assumes no shocks other than longevity risk. 
8 There are two other research lines of longevity risk 1) systematic risk, which results from incorrect 
assumptions about the base mortality rate and level of mortality improvement; and 2) stochastic mortality, 
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1.2 Market Risk 
Another significant risk comes from the U.S. retirement system shifting from defined 
benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) plans in recent decades.  Instead of being 
covered by pension benefits in retirement, individuals increasingly are taking 
responsibility for saving and investing, which used to be the responsibility of financial 
professionals.  With this shift, retirees face considerable risk of market volatility (Poterba 
et al. 2005).  They also face risk in the drawdown phase after retirement, because the 
literature suggests that retirees neither annuitize the plan assets nor make meaningful 
withdrawals other than following Required Minimum Distributions (RMD) unless they 
experience a financial or health shock.9  Therefore, retirement savings are exposed to 
large market risks such as the 2008 or 2020 market crash, and older workers may have 
very little time to recoup their losses.10  The same argument can be applied to the housing 
market as well, because few people are downsizing after retirement until they face a 
shock late in life.11  Interestingly, the literature suggests a significant gap between the 
subjective perceptions of market returns and actual returns.  For example, individuals 
have substantially lower expectations of stock market gains than historical averages 
would justify but higher expectations of volatility, a robust finding across various data 
sources and countries.12  This gap is consistent with low stock market participation, 
	
or aggregate mortality risk, meaning that future mortality rates are uncertain and agents update them by the 
drivers that are also stochastic.  They are beyond the scope of this paper. 
9 For example, see Poterba et al. (2011) and Brown (2009).  
10 See Butrica, Smith, and Toder (2010). 
11 Munnell et al. (2019) shows that almost 70% of homeowners stay in their home after retirement until 
they die.  
12 For example, HRS data by Dominitz and Manski (2007) and Hurd (2009) “Subjective Probabilities in 
Household Surveys”, Michigan Survey of Consumer Confidence by Dominitz and Manski (2005), and the 
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which suggests a welfare loss compared to investing under rational expectations 
(Angrisani, Hurd, and Meijer 2012). 
1.3 Health Risk 
Health costs in retirement have increased substantially over the past few decades.13  In 
the empirical data, out-of-pocket medical expenses rise quickly with age, and the 
potential liquidity shortages caused by health costs is a crucial driver of saving for 
retirement (De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010), especially for long-term care (Kopecky 
and Koreshova 2009).  A recent study finds that 70 percent of adults who survive to age 
65 develop severe long-term services and supports (LTSS) needs before they die and 48 
percent receive some paid care over their lifetime (Johnson 2019).  Most will receive 
informal help from family and friends, but increasing numbers of older Americans will 
receive home care from paid helpers and many will end up in nursing homes (Johnson, 
Toohey, and Weiner 2007).  Although predictors such as permanent income, initial 
health, and initial marital status have large effects on LTSS spending, much of the 
dispersion in such spending is due to events that occur later in life (Jones et al. 2018), 
which makes it difficult to predict.  Thus, the prospect of becoming disabled and needing 
care is perhaps the most significant risk facing older Americans.  Not surprisingly, more 
affluent individuals said in a recent survey that they were more worried about rising 
health care costs than about any other financial issue (Merrill Lynch Wealth 	
data from De Nederlandsche Bank Households Survey for Dutch households by Hurd, Van Rooij, and 
Winter (2011). 
13 For example, see 2019 Fidelity Retiree Health Care Cost Estimate. 
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Management, 2012).  However, very few people take actions such as buying long-term 
care insurance, probably because those products are expensive, and low-income people 
have access to LTSS coverage through Medicaid (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008; Kopecky 
and Koreshkova, 2014; Friedberg et al. 2015).14 
1.4 Family Risk 
One type of risk that recently has increasingly gained attention in the literature is family 
risk, such as getting a divorce, family emergency, children needing help because of being 
ill or unemployed.15  This type of risk might be harder to manage than the longevity, 
market, and health risks because 1) it is difficult to predict and could have an affect over 
a long period of time (Rappaport, 2019); and 2) very few people have prepared 
financially for potential family events and challenges, but the empirical data suggests that 
this risk is not negligible.  For example, a survey conducted by Merrill Lynch 
investigated the link between retirement and family issues.  It found that 88 percent of 
respondents age 50+ have not budgeted or prepared for providing financial support to 
others; however, 62 percent of them have actually provided an average $14,900 in 
financial assistance to family members in the last five years.16  More recent studies on 
family transfers confirm the empirical findings that many older adults provide financial 
help to younger family members rather than vice versa.  For example, the Employee 
	
14 Many but not all initial stays in nursing homes qualify for Medicare. 
15 Sellars and Cutler (2019). 
16 Among respondents age 50+ who provided money to family members in the last five years, most of the 
recipients (68%) are adult children (age 21+), following by grandchildren (26%). See Merrill Lynch, 
“Family & Retirement: The Elephant in the Room,” study in partnership with Age Wave, 2016.  
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Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) reports that 28-51 percent of older households make 
cash transfers to young family members that average between $14,000 and $17,000 (the 
amounts vary by age group), while only 5 percent of older households receive transfers 
from younger family members.17  Not surprisingly, retirees would be willing to make 
sacrifices to financially support family members, especially their children and 
grandchildren even if they could not really afford it.  However, other family risks are not 
that “enjoyable”.  For example, gray divorce – divorce among older adults – increased 
from 2 percent in 1960 to 14 percent in 2010 (Merrill Lynch, 2016), costing about 
$15,000 per person (Thumbtack, 2020).18 
1.5 Policy Risk 
Last but not least, policy risk such as Social Security reform or pension plan benefit 
reduction has a dramatic impact on retirement security as well.  Social Security is the 
primary income source for most retirees, and the trust fund reserves are projected to 
become exhausted in 2035.  After that, payroll taxes are expected to be enough to pay 
about 75 percent of scheduled benefits under current law.19  Therefore, without any 
changes from the Congress, there would be a 25 percent benefit reduction to everybody.  
However, it is unlikely to happen for the following three reasons.  First, the current trust 
fund shortfall – $35.2 trillion closed group unfunded liabilities as of 2019 (Nickerson and 
	
17 Banerjee (2015). 
18 For more discussion about the impact of divorce on retirement security in general, see Munnell, Hou, and 
Sanzenbacher (2018) 
19 SSA (2019a). 
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Burkhalter, 2019) –  is conceptually related to the positive lifetime net transfers received 
by the earliest generations of program participants, sometimes called Legacy Debt or the 
Missing Trust Fund that built up during the early years of the Social Security program 
(Leimer 2016).  This fact suggests that taxing society more widely, such as through an 
income tax increase, might be a better approach than benefit reduction (Munnell, Hou, 
and Sanzenbacher, 2017).20  Second, although benefit changes have played a significant 
role in restoring Social Security solvency historically, it has not been the only way.  For 
example, Diamond (2018) shows that, in the 1983 legislative reforms, 39 percent of the 
solution to Social Security’s shortfalls comes from beneficiaries, which is smaller than 
the 44 percent contributed from the taxpayers.21  Third, even benefit changes rarely take 
the form of direct benefit cuts; rather are carried out through actions such as delay the 
cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) and raise the normal retirement age from the 1983 
reform.  Aubry and Crawford (2017) document and compare the reform patterns for over 
200 major state and local pension plans after the financial crisis, and they confirm that the 
changes in employee contributions and COLAs the most prevalent reforms.  Furthermore, 
benefit cuts tend to be phased in, and therefore impose little of their burden on the people 
already receiving benefits.  However, on the subjective side, people seem too pessimistic 
about their future benefits from Social Security.  According to a recent survey from Pew 
in 2019, only 23 percent of workers approaching to retirement expect to receive benefits 
	
20 The fact that the unfunded obligation comes from the legacy debt is likely not enter the calculus of the 
congress.  One reason why congress is unlikely to cut the benefits is that they see considerable support for 
the program among their constituents. 
21 For the rest of the solution, 16 percent from coverage extensions, and 1 percent from others.  
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at the current level; 48 percent say benefits will be provided but will be reduced; and 28 
percent expect to receive no benefit at their retirement.22   
 
To sum up, the literature shows that retirees with limited financial resources face the 
following risks: out-living one’s money (longevity risk), investment losses (market risk), 
unexpected health expenses (health risk), unforeseen family needs (family risk), and 
retirement benefit cuts (policy risk).  Due to the financial literacy and personal bias, 
retirees often have beliefs of those risks deviating from the risk distributions shown in the 
empirical data.  No study to date has 1) systematically and simultaneously valued and 
ranked the financial impacts of these risks within a unified framework; and 2) measured 
various sources of retirement risk from both the objective and subjective perspectives. 		
	
22 Pew Research Center, March 2019, “Looking to the Future, Public Sees an America in Decline on Many 
Fronts” 
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2 DATA 
This paper mainly uses the data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a biennial 
longitudinal survey of a representative sample of Americans over age 50.  The survey 
interviews approximately 20,000 respondents every two years on subjects like health 
care, housing, assets, pensions, employment, and disability.  It is the most comprehensive 
survey of older Americans, and the economic measures captured by the survey data are 
regarded as being of very high quality.23   
2.1 Retirement Wealth 
The HRS wealth and income data have been widely used in the retirement research field.  
This paper looks at retirement wealth for households around age 65 in the HRS 2016 
survey.24  Wealth includes 1) housing wealth, which is the net value of the primary 
residence, calculated as the gross value of the primary residence less any relevant 
mortgages and home loans; 2) retirement savings calculated as the total balances of all 
accounts from 401(k)s, 403(b)s, and other DC plans, and IRA accounts if any exists; and 
3) other financial wealth, which is calculated as the sum of the value of stocks, bonds, 
mutual funds, and the value of checking, savings, and money market accounts, 
	
23 French and McCauley (2017).  
24 The HRS 2018 survey data is published by the time of this paper, however, the analytical weights data 
has not been available yet.  Hence, this paper uses HRS 2016 survey data for the analysis. 
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certificates of deposit, and government savings bonds – minus debts and holdings of all 
DC and IRA assets .25   
 
Table 1. Median Retirement Wealth for Households at Age 65. 
Panel A: Single men 
 P50 P75 P90 P95 Mean 
Housing wealth $95,869 $217,302 $396,789 $1,065,206 $176,578 
Retirement saving 140,607 269,497 575,212 710,919 221,752 
Other financial wealth 53,260 181,085 514,495 3,216,924 292,923 
Total retirement wealth 323,823 742,005 1,335,567 4,388,651 691,253 
 
Panel B: Single women 
 P50 P75 P90 P95 Mean 
Housing wealth 138,477 255,650 532,603 605,037 194,501 
Retirement saving 117,173 276,954 585,864 795,397 273,341 
Other financial wealth 15,978 85,217 388,800 826,600 159,413 
Total retirement wealth 378,148 634,330 1,250,552 1,596,432 627,255 
 
Panel C: Married couples 
 P50 P75 P90 P95 Mean 
Housing wealth 191,737 362,170 568,820 852,165 287,360 
Retirement saving 289,736 693,449 1,246,292 1,790,612 517,085 
Other financial wealth 47,934 213,041 670,015 1,576,506 357,276 
Total retirement wealth 645,515 1,308,997 2,402,041 4,170,283 1,161,721 
 
Source: Hou and Sanzenbacher (2020), and HRS 2016. 
Note: In 2020 dollars. The sample restricts to households having defined contribution wealth and housing 
wealth. 	
 
Table 1 shows the median household wealth for single men, single women, and married 
couples calculated in Hou and Sanzenbacher (2020).  To map the traditional concept of 
net worth, total household wealth here excludes Social Security and private sector 	
25 For households where debt exceeds wealth, the measure of non-DC financial wealth is allowed to be 
negative. Similarly, for households where debt exceeds equity, housing wealth is allowed to be negative. 
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defined benefit wealth, which is already in the form of income flows and doesn’t require 
taking withdrawals.26  This paper applies the Social Security benefit data documented in 
Clingman, Burkhalter, and Chaplain (2019), which is $20,355 for a typical worker with 
median earnings and retired at 65.27 
2.2 MEDICAL EXPENDITURES 
Medical expenditures are defined as the sum of what the individual spends out of pocket 
on insurance premiums, drug costs, hospital stays, nursing home care, doctor visits, 
dental visits, and outpatient care, excluding expenses covered by public or private 
insurance.  The HRS collects this data through both the regular interviews in the core 
surveys and through the exit surveys, which cover the medical costs in the last years of 
life.  French et al (2017) compare the medical expenditure data from the HRS, the 
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), and the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS).  They find that the HRS data is more comprehensive and that it matches 
up well with the data from other datasets.   
 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for medical expenditures by gender and age groups 
using HRS 2016.  It illustrates the fat tail of the medical spending distribution found in 
the literature (e.g., French et al, 2017; Jones et al, 2018). 
 	
26 Since DB plans are not common any more, they are not included in the analysis, but they are well 
documented in Hou and Sanzenbacher (2020). 
27 See the appendix Table A1 for more detail. 
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Table 2. Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditures over Two-year Period, by Age and Gender. 
Panel A: Men 
Age Mean Std P50 P90 P95 
65-69 $2,674 $4,783 $1,096 $6,471 $10,099 
70-74 3,310 5,398 1,612 7,535 12,464 
75-79 3,721 7,607 1,677 8,491 13,113 
80-84 4,849 16,592 1,683 8,771 14,833 
85+ 8,437 20,231 2,021 16,768 37,813 
Total 3,866 10,119 1,505 8,115 13,221 
 
Panel B: Women 
Age Mean Std P50 P90 P95 
65-69 $3,216 $5,593 $1,489 $7,984 $12,361 
70-74 3,747 6,674 1,797 8,706 13,973 
75-79 3,576 6,579 1,505 8,685 13,113 
80-84 5,144 14,208 1,694 10,190 16,123 
85+ 12,083 36,146 1,806 22,496 73,469 
Total 4,968 16,075 1,612 9,781 15,693 
 
Source: HRS 2016. 
Note: In 2020 dollars. 
2.3 FAMILY TRANSFERS  
Family transfers are defined as financial help, such as giving money, helping pay bills, or 
covering specific costs for medical care, insurance, schooling, a home down payment, 
rent, etc.  The HRS survey collects the amount of given and received by children, parents, 
other relatives, and friends.  This paper calculates the net transfer as the sum of total 
money transferred out of the retired household less the total amount received.  Table 3 
shows that roughly one-third of households age 65+ making family transfers over a two-
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year period, mainly in the form of giving money to children.28  Among the households 
making transfers, the median amount is $3,300 over the two years, but the mean is highly 
skewed at $11,000. 
 
Table 3. Net Family Transfers over Two-Year Period by Age. 
Age 
Share of 
households 
making 
transfer 
Among households making transfer 
Mean Std P50 P90 P95 
65-74 42.8% $10,439 $38,661 $3,269 $24,683 $41,409 
75-84 34.0 12,732 91,254 3,051 27,242 54,485 
85+ 28.3 10,092 30,076 2,179 36,505 64,005 
Total 38.6 11,024 57,200 3,269 26,153 43,588 	
Source: HRS 2014 (the latest available data for HRS RAND family files). 
Note: In 2020 dollars. 
2.4 SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATIONS 
The HRS has asked respondents to assess the probability of various outcomes. The 
respondents give a number from 0 to 100 where 0 means absolutely no chance and 100 
means absolutely sure to happen.29  The rest of this section discusses the questions for 
each retirement risk source in this analysis. 
 
	
28 The statistics by types of transfers are shown in the appendix Table A2. 
29 The exact wording of the questions in the HRS is summarized in the appendix Table A3.   
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2.4.1 Survival Probabilities 
The survival probability question is asked based on the respondent’s current age.  If the 
age is less than 65, the question is asked for the chance of living to age 75; if the age is 
65-69, the target age asked is age 80, and so on.30  Due to the high frequency of focal 
point responses, the HRS has introduced a control question since 2006 to respondents 
who answer 50 percent to understand whether the respondent’s answer expresses 
epistemic uncertainty.  This paper exploits that question by recoding the answers as 
missing unless they are confirmed as equally likely.31   
 
Table 4. Probability of Living to Age 80 for Age 65-69 in 2016. 
 Average 
expectation  
Expectation implied by 
life table 
At age 65 At age 69 
Men 58.3% 66.0% 69.7% 
Women 64.0 75.0 77.7 	
Source: HRS 2016 and author’s calculation. 
 
Table 4 shows the average subjective probability of 65- to 69-year-olds living to age 80 
answered, compared with the empirical life table probabilities.32  It is clear that 
	
30 No such questions asked for age 90+.   
31 The control question asks “Do you think that it is about equally likely that you will die before age X as it 
is that you will live to age X or beyond, or are you just unsure about the chances, or do you think no one 
can know these things?” The missing is recoded for the answers of “unsure”, “can’t know”, “don’t know”, 
and “refused to answer”. 
32 The calculation is based on unpublished cohort life tables used for 2019 SSA trustees report by the Social 
Security’s Office of the Chief Actuary. It is available upon request. 
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individuals are pessimistic about their survival probabilities.33  For example, the 
probability for a woman at ages 65 to 69 living to age 80 is 75 percent to 78 percent, but 
women of this age in the survey have an average expectation of only 64 percent, which is 
much lower than the lower bound of the range. 
2.4.2 Stock Performance 
The HRS has elicited respondents’ beliefs about the stock returns since 2002 by asking 
the probability that stocks will be worth more next year than they are today.34  Similar to 
the survival probability questions, a control question was added in 2006 for respondents 
who answer 50 percent.35  Moreover, since 2010 respondents have been asked two more 
questions to provide additional data points: the chance of gaining 20 percent or more over 
the next year and the chance of losing 20 percent or more .   
 
To review the performance of all U.S. equity securities, Figure 1 shows the historical 
price change for the Wilshire 5000 Price Index, which is widely accepted as the definitive 
benchmark for the U.S. equity market.36  The return bounces between the plus- and 
minus-20 percent range but stays positive most of the time.  On the contrary, Table 5 
shows that individuals on average have very pessimistic and larger volatility expectations 	
33 The subjective expectations are higher than the range implied by life table in late life, which shows the 
optimism and survival bias (O’Dea and Sturrock 2018).  However, for the analysis of the life cycle model 
in this paper, the subjective survival probabilities at age 65-69 are more relevant. 
34 As a proxy of stock market, the question asks the mutual fund shares invested in blue chip stocks like 
those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  
35 In HRS 2008 only, this follow-up question is added to respondents who answer 0% and 100% as well. In 
2002, a question for 10 percent or more was added in the survey.  In 2008, one of the eight questions, 
market gains/losses 10/20/30/40 percent or more, was randomly assigned to respondents. Since those 
questions are only appear in one year of the survey, this paper doesn’t use them in the analysis. 
36 The empirical analysis also uses Wilshire 5000 to calculate the stock return volatility. 
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than the empirical data indicate, and the pattern is stable by gender, age, and survey 
years.  For example, the chance that stock prices will be higher next year is consistently 
less than half, and the chance that prices will gain or lose 20 percent more next year are 
both always about one-quarter.  One might blame this negative emotion on the 
aftereffects of the global financial crisis.  However, Heiss et al. (2019) find a similar 
result through another panel dataset covering the periods before and after the financial 
crisis.37 
	
Figure 1. Historical Nominal Price Change from Wilshire 5000 Price Index,1972-2019. 
	
Source: Wilshire 5000 Price Index,1972-2019 	
Table 5. Expectation of the Stock Market Performance in the Next Year. 
	
37 See Figure 2 in Heiss et al. (2019).  The expectation of market gain is never above 50% from 2004 to 
2016. 
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 Lose 20% 
more 
Worth 
more 
Gain 20% 
more 
All 24.0% 42.6% 23.0% 
By gender:    
Men 22.5 45.8 22.0 
Women 25.6 39.5 24.1 
By year:    
2010 22.1 41.9 23.8 
2012 25.2 41.9 23.0 
2014 24.4 42.8 23.2 
2016 24.4 43.9 22.3 
By age:    
65-69 25.7 45.1 23.7 
70-74 25.0 43.5 23.2 
75-79 22.6 40.5 22.6 
80-84 21.7 39.9 22.8 
85+ 19.3 37.1 20.7 	
Source: HRS 2010-2016. 
2.4.3 Housing Price 
Similar questions for respondents’ expectations of their home value have been asked 
since 2010 HRS.  Rather than asking everyone whether prices will be 20 percent higher 
and 20 percent lower, the HRS randomly assigned to respondents one of eight future 
values, gain/fall more than 10, 20, 30 and 40 percent compared to what it is worth today.   
 
Table 6. Expectation of the Housing Price Change in the Next Year. 
Performance 
Loss 
40% 
more 
Loss 
30% 
more 
Loss 
20% 
more 
Loss 
10% 
more 
Worth 
more 
Gain 
10% 
more 
Gain 
20% 
more 
Gain 
30% 
more 
Gain 
40% 
more 
Expectation 15.8% 18.0% 20.0% 22.0% 52.6% 35.4% 27.1% 22.8% 19.1% 	
Source: HRS 2010-2016 
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Table 6 shows the average answers of these questions.  Among the respondents who have 
been asked the chance of their home value being worth more by this time next year, their 
average expectation is 53 percent.  Among the answers of falling more than 40 percent 
and gaining more than 40 percent, the average chances are 16 percent and 19 percent.   	
Figure 2. CDF of Housing Price Change, Subjective Distribution vs. Empirical Data. 
	
Source: HRS 2010-2016 and All-Transactions House Price Index for the U.S. 1975-2019. 	
To be intuitive, Figure 2 converts the average answers to those questions to a subjective 
probability distribution and plots its cumulative distribution function (CDF) to compare 
with the historical housing market data.38  Similar to the stock market responses, the 
	
38 Similar to the answers for stock market, there is no significant difference among demographic groups at 
average level in the subjective expectation of the housing price.  See Appendix Table A4 for statistics by 
demographics. 
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house price responses show a significant overestimation of market volatility.39  The 
change in housing prices, when calculated based on All-Transactions House Price Index 
for the U.S., never goes out of the range of plus- and minus- 20 percent in the period of 
1975-2019, but people clearly have a much larger range in mind.  One might argue that 
the regional housing price data is a better reference than national average, because HRS 
asks the change of their own housing price, and diversification is impractical for most of 
the households. 	
Figure 3. S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index Change, 1988-2019. 
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index, 1988-2019. 
 	
39 Although we can’t rule out the impact of housing bubble burst because of the data only from 2010 
onwards, this finding is consistent with earlier literature. For example, Capozza and Seguin (1996) provide 
evidence that participants tend to overreact to the housing market. 
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Figure 3 shows the indexes of 10 major Metropolitan Statistical areas in the U.S. that are 
used to create the S&P/Case-Shiller 10-City Composite Home Price Index.  Similar to the 
stock price pattern in Figure 1, the housing returns bounce between the plus- and minus-
20-percent range for most of the time, and never go 40 percent above or 30 percent 
below. 	
2.4.4 Medical Spending 
Since 2010, the HRS has also asked for respondents’ expectations of their medical 
expenditures, defined as out-of-pocket medical spending such as doctor and dentist 
expenses, hospitals, nursing homes, prescription drugs and any others, excluding what is 
covered by insurance.  To begin with, the respondents are asked to estimate the 
probability of spending $1,500 or more in the coming year.  Depending on the answer to 
this question, they are then asked about other thresholds such as $500, $3,000 and 
$8,000.  For example, if the respondent feels having zero chance of spending $3,000, 
then the question about $8,000 in spending won’t be asked.   
 
Table 7. Subjective Expectation of Medical Spending in the Next Year. 
Panel A: Men 
Age 
Spend 
$1500+ 
Spend 
$3000+ 
Spend 
$8000+ 
65-69 44.2% 25.7% 11.7% 
70-74 45.1 25.9 12.3 
75-79 43.1 24.6 11.8 
80-84 42.9 25.5 12.4 
85+ 41.6 26.1 13.7 
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Panel B: Women 
Age 
Spend 
$1500+ 
Spend 
$3000+ 
Spend 
$8000+ 
65-69 44.0% 26.1% 13.0% 
70-74 44.5 26.9 13.9 
75-79 40.5 24.6 12.8 
80-84 39.0 23.9 12.6 
85+ 36.7 22.9 13.3 	
Source: HRS 2010-2016. 
Table 7 shows the average subjective expectations for various spending thresholds by age 
group.40  It is surprising to see that the expectations barely change as age increases.  
Given the patterns in Table 2 for the empirical data, older people seem to underestimate 
medical spending, and younger people seem overestimate.  
2.4.5 Family Transfers 
Similar to the medical spending questions, the first HRS question about family transfers 
is to estimate the chances of giving/receiving financial help of $5,000 or more in the next 
10 years.  In 2004 and 2006, other thresholds such as $1,000, $10,000 and $20,000 or 
more were asked based on the answers to previous questions.41  Unfortunately, the 
transfer expectation was removed in the 2008 and later surveys.  Based on 2006 data, the 
average expectation of the chance that HRS households age 65+ will provide financial 
help of $5,000 or more is 34.8 percent; the expectation of receiving $5,000 is 9.2 
	
40 Statistics by gender and survey years are similar.  See the appendix Table A5 for detail. 
41 For example, if the respondent answers less than 30 percent chance to the question of $5,000 or more, 
then the question of $1,000 will be asked; if the answer is greater than 30 percent, the follow up question is 
$10,000.  Because those questions are asked only under certain conditions, this analysis doesn’t include 
them. 
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percent.42  These subjective estimates for the next ten years are actually less than what 
Table 3 would show if converted to annual numbers.  It means that individuals 
underestimate the possibility of the family transfer, consistent with Merrill Lynch (2016). 
2.4.6 Social Security Benefit 
For the subjective expectation of a Social Security benefit reduction, the HRS questions 
are slightly different depending on whether the respondent is receiving a benefit now or 
will receive one in the future.  For modeling purpose, this paper focuses on the first 
question, which asks respondents for their expectation that the benefit they receive from 
Social Security will be cut at some point over the next 10 years.  The average answer is 
about 40 percent chance in HRS 2016, which is somewhat lower than other surveys, such 
as Walker et al. (2014) and Parker et al (2019).43  
 	
 
	
42 The variation by demographics such as gender and age group are fairly small.  See the Appendix Table 
A6 for detail. 
43 See the Appendix Table A7 for the variation by subgroups. 
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3 MODEL 
This paper constructs a lifecycle optimization model for a retired household with a 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function 𝑈! = "!"#$#$% .  This model has been 
widely used in the literature (e.g., Ameriks et al. 2011; Brown and Warshawsky 2013; 
Horneff et al. 2020).44  At the age of 65, the household holds housing wealth 𝐻&', 
retirement savings 𝐾&', and other financial wealth (liquid assets) 𝐿&', calibrated using the 
HRS household wealth data as shown in Table 1.45  At the beginning of each age 𝑡, the 
retiree needs to decide: 1) the withdrawal amount 𝐷! from retirement accounts, with a 
restriction of the RMD rule; 2) consumption 𝐶! of liquid assets; and 3) the share of assets 
invested in stocks and bonds.  During each year, the retiree faces five sources of risk as 
discussed below. 
3.1 LONGEVITY RISK 
At age 𝑡, the retiree faces an age-specific mortality rate 𝑞!	and a survival probability to 
next year   𝑝! = 1 −	𝑞!.  If the retiree dies, the bequest amount would be the total wealth 
	
44 Another frequently used utility form is Epstein-Zin-Weil-type preferences (e.g., Cocco et al 2005, Pang 
and Warshawsky 2010), which could be treated as a generalized form of CRRA.  
45 The literature acknowledges the importance of retirement timing decisions. For example, see Hou et al. 
(2018).  Despite the increasing Full Retirement Age (FRA) to 67 for the young cohorts, many still retire 
early. This paper focuses on quantifying the retirement risk instead of optimizing retirement decision.  
Thus, it assumes that the retirement begins at age 65, an average retirement age for men in the U.S. (CRR 
Frequently Requested Data, 2018).  
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at this time 𝐵! =	𝐿! +	𝐾! +	𝐻!.46   The objective mortality data come from the gender-
specific cohort life tables used in the 2019 Social Security Trustees Report, and this paper 
uses the cohort whose age 65 in 2020 (see Appendix Table A8).47  The subjective 
survival probability is estimated using the Gompertz model commonly used in the 
literature (e.g., Brown, 2002; Bissonnette et al. 2017; de Bresser, 2019; Colchero and 
Kiyakoglu, 2020) .48  The baseline hazard rate is homogenous, given by:  
 ℋ! =	𝑒()𝑒*!	 (1) 
 
where ℋ! is the mortality force at age 𝑡, the rate of aging 𝜆 > 0,  and 𝑒() > 0 is the initial 
level mortality determined by characteristics 𝑥 (including gender, race and ethnicity, 
education attainment, etc.) and their coefficients 𝛽.  To capture the heterogeneity, this 
paper introduces the idiosyncratic component using a frailty term that multiplies to the 
above homogenous hazard rate.  Following Bissonnette et al. (2017), this term is assumed 
to follow a gamma distribution with variance of 1/𝜍 . Hence, the survival probability 
from age 𝑡+ to  𝑡#, given by: 
 
	
46 The literature acknowledges the importance of the bequest motive.  For example, see Lockwood (2012), 
(2018). 
47 One would argue that the mortality rate is highly related to the health status. To avoid tracking how the 
transition of health status affect the mortality, this paper focuses on the situation where general illness and 
treatments do not impose a correlation between morbidity and assumed mortality.  The implicit assumption 
is that health spending is only undertaken if it is expected to result in support of longevity, at least at 
population average levels.  
48 Bissonnette et al (2017) shows that the Gompertz specification yields the best result using likelihood 
estimation.  They also test other forms, such as Weibull hazard, and the result is similar. 
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𝒮(𝑡#|𝑡+) = 		=𝜍 +	1𝜆 𝑒()(𝑒*!% − 1)𝜍 +	1𝜆 𝑒()(𝑒*!" − 1)>
, 	 (2) 
 
can be estimated using the self-reported probability of living to certain ages in the HRS 
data.49   
 
As documented in the literature, self-reported probabilities are subject to focal answers (0 
percent, 50 percent, and 100 percent) and rounding errors.50  One way to improve the 
accuracy of the estimate is to assume each respondent has a latent variable that indicates 
the standard for rounding the response values, for example, to multiples of 5, 10, 25, 25, 
and 100.  If Bayes’ theorem were applied here, a given answer by a respondent could be 
interpreted as some probability that the true subjective expectation lies in an interval 
according to the rounding standard.  Then, the probability of the rounding standard for 
each respondent could be joined with the survival probability function form above to 
perform the maximum likelihood estimation (e.g., Kleinjans and van Soest, 2014; 
Bissonnette and de Bresser, 2018).  However, this approach is not appropriate in this 
study for two reasons: 1) the estimated rounding standard for the same respondent might 
be inconsistent across the various subjective survey questions, such as for longevity risk, 
market risk, health risk, etc.; and 2) to estimate a universal rounding standard, one have 
	
49 This paper applies the coefficient in Bissonnette et al (2017) which are estimated using the same HRS 
data.  See the coefficient estimate in the appendix Table A9. 
50 Rounding is the familiar practice of reporting one value whenever a real number lies in an interval 
(Manski and Molinari, 2010). 
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to multiply all of the density functions together, which is computationally infeasible.51  In 
fact, O’Dea and Sturrock (2019) examine the rounding standard and find that individuals 
who answer 50 percent in survival questions almost always give a range of answers to 
other probability questions, and are no more likely to answer 50 percent to other 
questions than are the rest of the sample.52  Moreover, to estimate the rounding standard 
and construct upper and lower bounds on subjective expectations using the survey data 
alone is not sufficiently informative for making inferences either (Bissonnette and de 
Bresser 2018).  Since there is no clear evidence of consistently rounding up or rounding 
down in the data, this paper doesn’t consider the rounding standard in the estimation. 
3.2 MARKET RISK 
The market risk in the models comes from two sources: uncertain equity returns 𝑅- and 
uncertain housing returns 𝑅., assuming no correlation for simplicity.  In the empirical 
model, the equity price and housing prices are assumed to follow the log-normal 
distribution with parameters matching the historical mean and variance of the market 
data.53  Of course, many observers believe that equity returns will be lower in a low 
	
51 Manski and Molinari (2010) examine the HRS expectation module as a whole and find that a small 
fraction of respondents uses only focal answers throughout.  Most of respondents make full use of the 0%-
100% chance scale. 
52 They find that, of the 16,345 individuals who answered one or more survival questions, only 41 
individuals (0.2%) answered “50%” to all survival questions in all waves. 
53 It is arguable that whether housing price should be modeled as stationary process or not.  For example, 
Zhang, Jong and Haurin (2013) argues that the logarithm of real house price is not a unit root process.  
Shao, Chen and Sherris (2019) show that an ARMA(2,4) - GARCH(1,1) model is the optimal among the 
models they consider. 
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interest rate environment.54  To incorporate this, the analysis adjusts real equity returns 
from Ibbotson Large Cap Index and Wilshire 5000 based on the methods outlined in 
Burtless et al. (2016) updated with current returns data.55  This provides a real return to 
equity of 4.5 percent annually, which lines up with the latest market forecast for large-cap 
U.S. equities, such as State Street (2019).  For simplicity, bonds are assumed to earn a 
risk-free return 𝑅/ equal to 1 percent in real term.56  Furthermore, the housing data comes 
from S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index.  As discussed in Figure 3, the regional 
housing price data might be a batter reference than the national average, because the 
diversification is impractical for most of the retired households.  Table 8 shows the 
historical standard deviation of home price index changes at national level and ten major 
metropolitan areas.  The standard deviation at national level is 5.4 percent, while the 
numbers at the city level vary from 5.0 to 12.5 percent.  Thus, this project applies the 
	54	Many	industry	and	academic	experts	believe	future	equity	returns	will	be	lower	than	historical	returns,	mainly	due	to	a	decline	in	the	risk-free	rate.		For	industry	examples	of	future	expected	returns,	see	BlackRock	(2019)	and	Bogle	and	Nolan	(2015).		For	an	academic	discussion	of	why	the	risk-free	rate	may	be	lower	going	forward,	see	Summers	(2014,	2015).		Summers	suggest	six	factors.		First,	the	market	may	have	experienced	a	reduction	in	demand	for	capital	due	to	a	lower	capital	intensity	of	modern	firms	(e.g.,	WhatsApp	has	a	greater	valuation	than	Sony	with	virtually	no	capital	required	to	generate	that	value).		Second,	declining	population	growth	leads	to	lower	interest	rates	as	the	growth	of	the	labor	force	slows.		Third,	increasing	inequality	in	income	and	an	increasing	capital	share	of	income	would	both	increase	the	propensity	to	save.		Fourth,	a	decline	in	the	price	of	capital	goods	would	depress	interest	rates.		Fifth,	lower	inflation	serves	to	lower	the	after-tax	real	return	on	capital.		Finally,	globally	an	increasing	share	of	assets	is	invested	in	safe	assets	such	as	Treasury	bonds,	lowering	average	returns.	
55 Burtless et al. (2016) examines three approaches to determine what future equity returns might be.  The 
first is to look at the inverse of the price/earnings (P/E) ratio.  This ratio was 19.4 as of December 2018, 
which suggests a real return of 5.2 percent.  Short-term earnings yields, however, can be misleading.  
Campbell and Shiller (1998) argue that the 10-year earnings yield is a much better predictor of the returns 
on stocks.  The current cyclically adjusted PE (CAPE) ratio is 28.3, suggesting future long-run real returns 
of 3.5 percent (Shiller 2019).  The third approach is based on the Gordon growth model, which establishes 
a steady state relationship between market value, stock returns, and GDP.  Assuming a dividend yield of 
roughly 2.1 percent (Shiller 2019) and a projected GDP growth of 2.2 percent (Social Security 
Administration 2019b), the stock return implied by the Gordon equation is 4.3 percent.  The results of these 
three simple exercises suggest future real equity returns ranging from 3.5 percent to 5.2 percent.  Therefore, 
this project anchors the average simulated equity returns to 4.5 percent, the middle of this range. 
56 This assumption is consistent with most recent academic research and projections from the industry.  For 
example, see Horneff et al. (2020) and Morningstar (2018). 
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average of the standard deviation from these ten major Metropolitan Statistical areas that 
are used to create the S&P/Case-Shiller 10-City Composite Home Price Index.  Finally, 
Inflation risk is also worth considering over the long term; however, the literature 
suggests a small welfare impact from calibrating to low inflation variance in recent 
years.57  Therefore, this project models investment returns in real terms without taking 
into account inflation uncertainty.  Table 9 summarizes the market assumptions in the 
objective model. 
 
Table 8. Standard Deviation of Home Price Change from 1988 to 2019, by Regions. 
S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Index 5.4% 
S&P/Case-Shiller 10-City Composite 7.8% 
Greater Boston 6.1% 
Chicago metropolitan area 5.9% 
Denver-Aurora Metropolitan Area 5.0% 
Las Vegas metropolitan area 12.5% 
Greater Los Angeles 11.6% 
South Florida metropolitan area 10.5% 
New York metropolitan area 6.5% 
San Diego County, California 10.7% 
San Francisco 10.9% 
Washington Metropolitan Area 8.3% 
Average of 10 Metropolitan Statistical areas  8.8% 	
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index, 1988-2019. 	
Table 9. Market Return Assumptions from Empirical data, in Real Term. 
Asset class Housing Equity Bond  
Mean 1.0% 4.5% 1.0% 
Standard deviation 8.8% 15.7% 0.0% 
 
Source: Ibbotson Large Cap Index, Wilshire 5000, and S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index for U.S. 	
57 Munnell, Wettstein, and Hou (2019) consider stochastic inflation calibrated to the distribution from 
historical data after 2000, and they find the result changes in the welfare analysis are negligible. 
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For the estimation of the subjective market returns, this paper takes an approach that is 
simpler than the approach used in the subjective longevity analysis.58  Keep in mind that 
the purpose of this study is to quantify the objective and the subjective retirement risks 
from various sources and compare them; the purpose is not to discover the determinants 
of subjective expectations and how they interact with realized return.59  To that end, this 
paper estimates the typical retiree’s expectation of market returns by applying the sample 
average of the subjective probabilities as the data points, and then applies the same 
distribution type used in the empirical settings to estimate the underlying risk 
parameters.60  To avoid an over-identification issue when there are more data points than 
there are parameters to be estimated, a minimum distance estimation procedure is applied 
to obtain each risk distribution.61   There are two caveats under this approach.  First, by 
taking the averages of the cross-sectional data in the HRS survey, the study doesn’t make 
full use of the longitudinal feature of the HRS dataset.62  This seems problematic, since it 
is reasonable to believe that the market returns experienced by the respondents are likely 
to influence their subjective expectation for the future.  However, Heiss et al. (2019) 
study the subjective expectations elicited from a panel dataset covering the 2008 financial 
market crisis, and they find that most of respondents report return expectations that align 
	
58 As mentioned above, it is not appropriate in this study to estimate the rounding type for all sources of 
subjective expectations. 
59 Indeed, substantial heterogeneity of subjective expectations has been documented at the individual level.  
For example, see Heiss et al (2019) for how individuals’ expectations predict their stock-market decisions. 
60 One might argue that the rounding errors are somewhat mitigated by taking the averages. 
61 Hurd and Rohwedder (2011) take a different approach to calculate the mean and standard deviation from 
subjective risk distribution. Given the subjective questions, they separate the entire real line by mutually 
exclusive intervals and express the expectation answers using conditional expectation from historical 
distribution. Angrisani et al. (2013) experiment both approaches and show similar results. 
62 For example, the questions of 20% more or less for stock market expectation only introduced since 2010. 
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with random-walk process rather than mean reversion or persistence updating.63  To some 
extent, their finding mitigates this issue; nevertheless, little is known about how 
individuals form and adjust their expectations.  Second, assuming the same distribution 
type for the subjective analysis as is used in the empirical study is a common procedure 
in the literature (Manski, 2018); however, a different type of distribution might better fit 
to the subjective data (Smithson and Blakey, 2018).  As an example, this paper examines 
over 60 continuous distribution types that are commonly used to estimate the subjective 
distribution of housing returns, and certainly some distributions fit the data better, as 
shown in the Appendix Table A10 and Figure A2.  However, it is well beyond the scope 
of this study to identify the best distribution type used in the estimation of each risk 
source.  Hence, this paper leaves this question for future work.   
3.3 HEALTH RISK 
This model assumes that medical expenses are exogenous and are not used in the 
calculation of utility.  This assumption implies that the household makes medical 
expenditure only if it supports the average longevity of the population.64  The objective 
analysis follows the common settings in the literature (e.g., De Nardi et al 2010), and the 
dynamic of the stochastic out-of-pocket health expenses 𝑀! at age 𝑡 is given by: 
	
63 They use the CentER Panel data of about 2,000 Dutch households over a 12-year period, including the 
2008 financial market crisis. 
64 The literature varies in treating the costs of health care in the utility function.  For example, Yogo (2009) 
develops a model where retirees choose the level of health expenditure and the allocation of wealth 
between bonds, stocks, and housing. In his setting, the medical expenditures are endogenous. See Pang and 
Warshawsky (2010) for more discussion. 
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 𝐿𝑛	𝑀! = 𝑚(𝑡) + 	𝜎(𝑡) ∗ 	𝜓!	 (3) 
 
where 𝑚(𝑡) and 𝜎(𝑡) are the mean and variance of the log of medical expenses that 
depend on demographics such as age and gender. The idiosyncratic component 𝜓! is 
decomposed to two parts, a transitory shock 𝜀!!012  and a permanent shock 𝑃!, which is 
assumed to follow an AR(1) process with innovation 𝜀!3-04.65 
 𝜓! =	𝑃! + 𝜀!!012	 (4) 
 𝑃! =	𝑃!$# ∗ 	𝜂	 + 𝜀!3-04	 (5) 
 
The distributions and dynamics are calibrated using out-of-pocket medical expenses in 
the HRS as described in the data section.66  Similar to the settings for the objective risk 
distribution, the subjective medical expenses over the next year are assumed to follow the 
log-normal distribution with age-specific parameters 𝑚(𝑡) and 𝜎(𝑡) estimated for five 
age subgroups, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80-84, and 85+.67 
 
	
65 French and Jones (2004) show that medical spending shocks are well described by the sum of a persistent 
AR (1) process and a white noise shock.  Feenberg and Skinner (1994) find a similar result.  See also Hirth 
et al. (2015). 
66 This paper applies the coefficients estimated in De Nardi et al. (2010). See the Appendix Table A11. 
67 As for the subjective market expectations, this paper assumes a random-walk setting rather than AR (1) 
process to avoid over-assumptions restricted by data limitation. Another way to see this is that, for an agent 
at average health status to make decisions at the beginning of the retirement, the best approach to make 
assumptions of future medical expenditure without experiencing the realized expenses is to use the average 
expectation from the older counterparties. 
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3.4 FAMILY RISK 
For married couples, the main source of uncertainty is from the spouse, such as the 
spousal medical expenditures and mortality.  To reflect this spousal risk, two steps are 
required to upgrade the model from singles to married couples: 1) similar to the head of 
the household, the spouse is also exposed to longevity risk through an uncertain life span; 
health risk through uncertain medical expenditures; and policy risk through Social 
Security reform;68 and 2) to represent married couples in the analysis, the utility function 
for singles 𝑈! = "!"#$#$%    changes to 𝑈! = 𝜏	(𝜔. "!&"#$#$% +	𝜔5 "!'"#$#$% ), where 𝐶!. and 𝐶!5 are 
consumption for the head and the spouse at period	𝑡, assuming equally divided, equal 
Pareto weights 𝜔. = 𝜔5 = 0.5, and an equivalence scale of consumption for couples 𝜏 =1.52 taken from Browning et al. (2013).  In addition to the spouse, a second source of 
family risk is the unforeseen transfer of financial help provided to children, parents, 
relatives or friends.69   
 
For the objective analysis, the transfer is simply modeled as a binomial event with a 
probability and average amount for each year, using the HRS data.70  This is due to the 
relatively low probabilities and low dollar amounts documented in Table 3 compared to 
the impact of non-family risks above.  To be precise, the amount of transfer 𝐹! at age 𝑡 is 
	
68 The longevity and health risks from the head and the spouse are assumed to be independent. 
69 The family transfers in the model are modeled as shocks and expenses during the underlying period and 
are not included in the consumption and utility function.69   
70 The HRS collects the family transfer data for two-year period. Assuming the independency in each year, 
this paper calculates the corresponding annual probability and transfer amount.  Similar procedure is taken 
for subjective questions which asks for next ten years. 
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a random variable taking values of 𝐹#, 𝐹6, and 𝐹7, respectively, for the age ranges 65-74, 
75-84, and 85+ with corresponding probabilities of 𝜑#, 𝜑6, and 𝜑7, and taking the value 
of zero otherwise.  On the subjective side, the probability of having a family transfer at 
the given age ranges (i.e., 𝜑#, 𝜑6 and 𝜑7) is based on the subjective expectations in HRS 
data.  Due to data limitations, the transfer values 𝐹#, 𝐹6, or 𝐹7 remain the same as in the 
empirical data. 
3.5 POLICY RISK 
It is difficult to model Social Security benefit reform because there is not much historical 
data for this.  Therefore, this project relies on Social Security history and expert opinions 
(e.g., Diamond 2018) for the best predictions.71  In the objective settings, the benefit 
reduction is modeled as a one-time COLA delay that randomly happens between now and 
2035.  That means the benefit will be 2 percent lower in real term for the rest of the life 
once the policy has changed.  The year to start the lower benefit follows a hazard 
probability model, with the probability of zero at the initial period gradually (linearly) 
increasing over a 15-year period to 100 percent in 2035, when the Social Security trust 
fund is projected to run out.  Other types of adjustments – including the financial impact 
of a benefit cut on a person who retires at age 65 if the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) 
increased to age 70 or a harsh 25 percent benefit cut to restore trust fund insolvency – are 
shown as the robustness check in the appendix.72 	
71 The assumption is also based on the conversion with Alicia Munnell. 
72 For birth cohort 1960 or later, the Social Security benefit is 100 percent for retirement age 67 (the FRA).  
If the retirement age is 65, or two years earlier than FRA, the benefit is 86.67 percent of the full amount; if 
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The subjective assumption relies on the self-reported expectations of benefit cuts in the 
HRS.  The annual probability is taken from the average expectation.73  The magnitude of 
the expectations of a benefit cut is modeled in the same way as the objective setting. 
3.6 SOLVING THE MODEL 
This paper first solves the life cycle optimization model that uses all of the sources of risk 
following the empirical settings discussed above.  The product of this step is an 
optimized policy function indicating how much to consume and invest over the life cycle, 
and an associated expected lifetime utility serving as a benchmark.  The second step is to 
quantify each source of objective risk by solving the alternative models with one risk 
removed at a time and comparing the result to the benchmark lifetime utility.  The final 
step is to repeat the exercise above but using subjective risk distributions calibrated using 
the expectations in the survey instead of the objective risk distributions from empirical 
data. 
 
For simplicity, this section demonstrates the optimization model using the simplified 
notation for singles.74  Following the life cycle model literature, the optimization problem 
	
five years earlier, the benefit is only 70 percent.  If FRA increases to 70, the current retirement age 65 in 
the model of this paper is five years earlier than the new FRA.  The benefit cut is equivalent to 1 – 70% / 
86.67% = 19.2% 
73 This project takes the sample average in the 2016 HRS, because the result does not vary much across 
demographic groups. 
74 The full version of the model for couples can be found in the appendix. 
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is to maximize 𝑉! in the following Bellman equation, where time preference 𝜌 is assumed 
to be 0.96 and bequest motive 𝑏 is assumed to be 2 as commonly used in the literature 
(e.g., Horneff et al. 2020).75 
 
𝑉! = 𝑈!(𝐶!) + 	𝜌	𝐸! V	𝑝!	𝑉!8# + (1 − 𝑝!)	𝑏	𝑈! W1𝑏 𝐵!XY	 (6) 
 
Adapting Deaton (1991), the household’s total cash-in-hand is denoted as 𝑋! and defined 
as the sum of all wealth resources including liquid cash, retirement savings and housing 
wealth.  The budget constraints are given by:  
 𝑋! = 𝐻! + 𝐾! + 𝐿!	 (7) 
 𝐻!8# =	𝐻! ∗ 	𝑅!8#. 	 (8) 
 𝐾!8# 	= (𝐾! − 𝐷!) ∗ (𝑆!𝑅!8#- + (1 − 𝑆!)𝑅/) (9) 
 𝐿!8# 	= 	 (𝐿! +	𝐷! −	𝐶!) ∗ (𝑆!𝑅!8#- + (1 − 𝑆!)𝑅/) (10) 
 𝑋!8# = 𝐻!8# + 𝐾!8# + 𝐿!8#	 + 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!8#	 −	𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒!8#	 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥!8#	 (11)	
 
	
75 The CRRA risk aversion parameter 𝛾 = 5 in the benchmark model.  According to Horneff et al. (2020), 
those parameter values are also in line with those used in prior work on life-cycle portfolio choice.  For 
simplicity, the benchmark result has been done without bequest motive. Appendix shows sensitivity test for 
other parameter values.  
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Household income 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!8#	 includes 1) Social Security benefits 𝑌!8# =	𝐴!8#𝑌h, where 𝑌h  is the base level of annual benefit for a typical worker retired at 65 in 2020, and 𝐴!8# is 
the benefit adjustment status equals to 1 if no policy changes and less than 1 if benefit cut 
happens; and 2) the proceeds from selling the house if the liquid assets are not sufficient 
to cover a financial shock such as unexpected, large medical expenditures.76  The expense 
term 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒!8#	 includes: 1) medical expenditures 𝑀!8#; 2) the family transfer 𝐹!8# if 
it happens; and 3) the rent payment if the house has been sold.77  A flat marginal tax rate 
of 15 percent is assumed.78  
 
In real life, households that lack sufficient wealth to cover their large medical expenses 
might rely on Medicaid or other means-tested government programs.  The literature 
typically imposes no borrowing constraints and assumes a minimum consumption floor 
guaranteed by public transfers.79  In this model, households who exhaust their assets are 
assumed to have a consumption floor of $10,000 per year, corresponding roughly to the 
income which would allow them to meet the Medicaid eligibility criteria.80 
	
76 If there is a balance in the retirement savings account, the model assumes to make withdrawals to cover 
the shortage.  If still not enough, the house will be sold. 
77 The rent payment is assumed to be 20% of the household Social Security benefit if the house has not 
been sold. One subtle improvement of the current model is to assume that homeowners facing a random 
maintenance cost (such as roof repair) modeled as a percentage of housing value.  
78 The taxable income in this project is defined as adjusted gross income plus nontaxable interest plus half 
of Social Security benefits. Since the model does not distinguish between capital gains and yield on risky 
assets, there is no differential taxation on dividend and capital gains. To apply the current progressive tax 
system with seven income tax brackets 10%, 12%, 22%, 24%, 32%, 35% and 37% (IRS 2019) instead of a 
flat marginal rate assumption has no significant change to the result. 
79 The consumption floor plays the role as a valuable safeguard against catastrophic medical costs. This 
assumption has limited affect for the purpose of this study, i.e., quantifying the risk for a typical household.  
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) find that such social insurance programs discourage saving at the 
bottom of the wealth distribution, but have little effect on the wealth accumulation trajectory of more 
affluent individuals. 
80 See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2020). For an individual over age 65 in 2020, eligibility 
for institutional / nursing home Medicaid begins at $1,061 per month. Individuals above the Federal 
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To sum up, the state variables in this optimization problem are: age 𝑡, total wealth 	𝑋!, 
housing value 𝐻!, retirement saving balance 𝐾!, the level of permanent shock 𝑃!	as a 
proxy for health status, and the Social Security benefit adjustment status 𝐴!.  There are 
three choice variables: consumption 𝐶!; withdrawal 𝐷! from a retirement savings account; 
and the share invested in risky assets 𝑆!.  The stochastic shocks considered in this model 
include stock return 𝑅!8#- , housing return 𝑅!8#. , the innovation of permanent shock 𝜀!8#3-04 
and transitory shock 𝜀!8#!012 for medical expenditures 𝑀!8#, family transfers 𝐹!8#, and the 
Social Security policy change 𝛼!8#.   
 
As the number of state variables grows, the required computation increases 
exponentially; this creates a numerical burden called the “curse of dimensionality.”  A 
standard operation in the literature to solve this problem is to exploit the scale 
independence in the maximization problem by normalizing all variables with respect to 
one state variable, for example, permanent income (e.g., Cocco et al. 2005; Pang and 
Warshawsky, 2010; Horneff et al. 2020), or homogenous total wealth (e.g., Yogo 2018).  
However, there is no free lunch in using this approach.  This approach works only if all 
of the shocks follow a random walk.  If the underlying variable follows an autoregressive 
process such as the AR(1) process for health risk in this model, this approach can’t be 
applied.  Moreover, some policy rules, such as the Medicaid requirement, have fixed 
amounts.  To apply those rules, the state variable still needs to be tracked.  To mitigate 
	
Poverty Line may also face cost sharing of 10 percent of costs (see Kaiser Family Foundation 2017); 
consequently, they will retain roughly $10,000 per year. 
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the computational issue, this paper takes a different approach by exploiting the parallel 
computing techniques with distributed clusters (Linux cluster servers).81  Other numerical 
skills to speed up the backward induction process include discretizing the continuous 
state variables, multidimensional Cubic Spline interpolations, and Gaussian quadrature 
for numerical integrations (Judd et al. 2011).  The detail of the solution method is 
provided in the appendix. 
3.7 ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND UTILITY-EQUIVALENT WEALTH 
The alternative objective and subjective models are solved in the same way as their 
respective  benchmark models – with one risk removed at a time (while other risks stay 
the same) by the following way: 1) the longevity risk will be removed by fixing the life 
span of the model at the life expectancy; 2) the market risk, health risk and family risk 
will each be removed independently by using the mean level to replace the random 
shocks; and 3) the policy risk is removed by fixing the starting year of the Social Security 
benefit adjustment.82  After solving the model with, for example, the subjective health 
risk removed, the risk-averse retiree have a higher-level lifetime expected utility and will 
be better off.  Then, this project calculates the required initial wealth under this 
circumstance to reach the same level of lifetime expected utility as in the benchmark with 
all the risks.  The required initial wealth is lower due to the risk aversion assumption, and 
	
81 Under multiprocessing, the full version of the model runs about 25 hours. 
82 This is similar to the life span fixed at the life expectancy.  The starting year of the benefit adjustment is 
the random variable, and it is assumed fixed at the expectation under the no risk alternative.  
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the decrease of the wealth is then used as the measurement to quantify this risk.	83  The 
process is repeated for all risks using either objective or subjective risk distribution to 
obtain two sets of the rankings.	 
  
	
83 It essentially interprets the welfare gain by calculating the wealth required to reach the same maximized 
utility in the optimization model. Many other measurements and methodologies are essentially based on the 
same spirit.  For example, annuity equivalent wealth (AEW) such as in Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), Brown 
(2001), and Milevsky and Huang (2018), and average certainty equivalent consumption (ACE) such as in 
Warshawsky (2017). 
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4 RESULTS 
This section has three parts.  The first section compares the empirical risk distributions 
and the estimated subjective risk distributions. The second section illustrates the lifecycle 
path for typical households. The third section ranks the retirement risks from both 
objective and subjective perspectives and discusses the policy implication. 
4.1 COMPARISON OF RISK DISTRIBUTIONS 
First, Figure 4 compares the life expectancy and standard deviation calculated from the 
population life tables (SSA, 2019) with the parametric model estimated from subjective 
data in the HRS.  Based on the life table, the life expectancies for men and women at age 
65 in 2020 are 84 and 86, with a standard deviation of 10 years.  However, in the 
estimation of subjective expectations, life expectancy is only 77 for men and 78 for 
women, with a smaller standard deviation of 7 years.  This pessimistic subjective 
expectation and smaller fluctuation is consistent with the findings in O’Dea and Sturrock 
(2018).84  It is not surprising, because parental longevity has been shown to be an 
important source of subjective life expectancy (Griffin et al 2013).85 The average parental 
death age for people who are around age 65 in the HRS 2016 is about 76.5, which is very 
close to the subjective estimation above.  A lower subjective life expectancy and smaller 
	
84 The estimation of subjective life expectancy is slightly lower than O’Dea and Sturrock (2018).  
85 Griffin et al 2013 have a discussion of other factors such as 1) biomedical and genetic factors; 2) 
socioeconomic factors; 3) health behaviors; and 4) psychosocial factors. 
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standard deviation may also be one factor explaining why annuities are not popular (e.g., 
O’Dea and Sturrock 2019). 
 
Figure 4. Life Expectancy and Standard Deviation. 
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
Note: The error bars are the standard deviations. 
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Figure 5. Survival Curve at Age 65. 
 
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
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Second, consistent with the literature and the data summarized in the previous sections, 
the estimation of subjective expectations for both the stock market and housing market 
are pessimistic and have a large standard deviation.  Figure 6 shows that the estimated 
mean of annual return using subjective expectations is 2.8 percent in real terms, smaller 
than the 4.5 percent in the objective model, and the standard deviation for subjective 
expectations is 37.2 percent, more than double of 15.7 percent from the empirical data.   
 
Figure 6. Stock Market Returns, Empirical Assumption vs. Subjective Estimation. 
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
The estimate for the housing returns in Figure 7 shows similar pattern.  One might blame 
this pessimistic perspective and large standard deviation on the after effects of the 2008-
09 financial crisis.  However, Heiss et al. (2019) study the subjective expectations over 
the period of the crisis and find a similar result.  Given such a large standard deviation, it 
is reasonable to speculate a much higher ranking for market risk on the subjective list. 
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Figure 7. Housing Market Returns, Empirical Assumption vs. Subjective Estimation. 
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
Interestingly, the estimation of medical expenditures shows mixed result.  While the 
empirical model shows a clear upward trend of health spending in Figure 8 for men and 
women after age 70, the estimation based on subjective expectations in Figure 9 shows a 
flat pattern as people age.  Comparing Figure 8 and Figure 9, the result suggests that 
retirees overestimate their medical spending at the beginning of their retirement years, 
and it turns out that those who survive to old ages are biased toward underestimating their 
medical costs in late life.  This might explain one of the reasons people don’t buy long-
term care insurance (see Henning-Smith and Shippee, 2015).86 
 
 
	
86 They find that 60 percent of respondents believed that they were unlikely to need long-term services and 
supports in the future, whereas the evidence suggests that nearly 70 percent of older adults will need them 
at some point. 
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Figure 8. Medical Expenditure Estimated from Empirical Data, by Age and Gender. 
 
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
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Figure 9. Medical Expenditure from Subjective Estimation. 
 
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
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4.2 LIFE CYCLE PATH SIMULATION 
Solving the life cycle model is a complicated process. And its product, the optimized 
policy function indicating how much to consume and invest over the life cycle, is often a 
multi-dimensional function that is not intuitive to visualize.  Therefore, it is better to 
perform Monte Carlo simulations and look at the simulated life cycle paths for 
consumption and wealth.  The first step is to apply the empirical risk distributions of all 
five risks to the benchmark model in the objective analysis.  Figure 10 illustrates the 
average optimal life cycle patterns for a single man retiring at age 65 with initial wealth 
calibrated using the data in Table 1.  The retirement savings increase in the beginning 
years of retirement and start declining with substantial withdrawals around early 70s 
when the RMD rule kicks in.  The patterns of life cycle path for a typical married couple 
is similar. 
 
Figure 10. Life Cycle Path for Consumption and Retirement Savings. 
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Source: author’s calculation. 
 
The next step is to solve the subjective benchmark model with the risk input from 
subjective risk distributions.  The shape of life cycle patterns is similar to the objective 
analysis; however, two differences are noticeable.  First, due to the shorter expected life 
span in the subjective model, the consumptions in early ages are slightly higher than the 
objective model, and significantly lower in late life, as shown in Figure 11.  Second, the 
share of the financial assets invested in risky assets is much lower in the subjective model 
(see Figure 12), which is not surprising because of the pessimistic perspective on the 
market returns and large expected volatilities.87  In the objective model, the share 
invested in stocks declines from 85 percent at age 65 to 52 percent at age 100; while in 
the same period of life, the percentage drops from 45 to 12 in the subjective model.  	
87 The financial assets here include both the retirement savings and liquid assets. 
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Figure 11. Lifetime Consumption Pattern, Objective Model vs. Subjective Model. 
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
Figure 12. Portfolio Share Invested in Stocks, Objective Model vs. Subjective Model. 
 Source: author’s calculation. 
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4.3 COMPARISON OF RISK DISTRIBUTIONS 
The final step is to compare the rankings of the risks that used the empirical data as 
inputs with the risks perceived by retirees.  Each risk is measured using the method of 
utility-equivalent wealth.  As the result of removing one risk, a risk-averse retiree would 
need less initial retirement wealth to reach the same lifetime utility level, and this wealth 
decease quantifies the economic value of the risk.  The ranking and the value of each 
source of risks for single men can be found in Table 10.   
 
Table 10. Objective Risk Ranking for Single Men. 
Ranking Source Value 
1 Longevity Risk 27.2% 
2 Health Risk 14.0% 
3 Market Risk 10.8% 
4 Family Risk 3.2% 
5 Policy Risk 0.1% 
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
The three main sources of objective risk, from highest to lowest, are longevity risk, health 
risk, and market risk.  It is not surprising that longevity risk is at the top of the list, 
because it affects the planning time horizon for retirement life.  Interestingly, the value of 
27 percent for the longevity risk is close to the 30 percent suggested in the literature (e.g., 
Mitchell et al. 1999; Milevsky and Young 2018).  Health risk ranks in second place, 
mainly due to the unpredictability of medical expenditures in late life, particularly the 
cost of long-term care.  Market risk ranks third, thanks to retirees’ relatively long 
investment horizon, which is about 20 years for average life expectancy.  Family risk and 
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policy risk are the smallest risks.  One big reason the policy risk is small is that Social 
Security reform is unlikely to have a significant impact on people who have already 
retired.  For younger cohorts who have not retired yet, this risk is likely to be much 
larger.  The risk ranking for married couples mirrors the result in singles, as shown in 
Table 11.  Because of the existence of the spouse, the relative value of the risks is larger 
overall. 
 
Table 11. Objective Risk Ranking for Married Couples. 
Ranking Source Value 
1 Longevity Risk 33.4% 
2 Health Risk 28.5% 
3 Market Risk 22.2% 
4 Family Risk 9.1% 
5 Policy Risk 0.1% 
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
Table 12. Subjective Risk Ranking for Single Men. 
Ranking Source Value 
1 Market Risk 31.0% 
2 Longevity Risk 14.6% 
3 Health Risk 9.6% 
4 Family Risk 1.1% 
5 Policy Risk 0.3% 
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
To complete the analysis, Table 12 shows the risk ranking from the subjective model.  
Given the large volatility of subjective expectations, it is not surprising to see that market 
risk is now at the top of the list.  The health risk is not as large as in objective ranking, 
because retirees significantly underestimate the medical expenses in old ages.  Due to the 
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pessimistic and relatively certain subjective life expectation comparing to what the life 
table implies, the longevity risk is smaller in subjective analysis.  A shorter expected life 
span also intensifies the market risk expectation because of a shorter investment horizon 
and reduces the subjective health risk due to lower chance facing the uncertain medical 
expenses in late life.   
 
The policy implications of this paper are threefold.  First, the rankings from the objective 
and subjective perspectives paint a clear picture: retirees do not have an accurate 
understanding of their true retirement risks.  This finding highlights the importance of 
educating the public on the actual sources of retirement risks, as outlined in the financial 
literacy literature (e.g., Mitchell and Lusardi 2011).  Second, this paper provides unique 
insight into the need for lifetime income products, such as annuities, which hedge 
longevity risk and market risk at the same time.  Policymakers should facilitate the 
inclusion of annuities in retirement plans and makes annuities portable between employer 
retirement plans.88  Finally, long-term care is also a significant risk faced by retirees, but 
one they often underestimate.  Better designed public programs and private products, 
possibly integrated with life annuities, could be encouraged to protect retirees with 
limited financial resources from this potentially cartographic risk. 	 	
	
88 The recent passed Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement (SECURE) Act is a good 
example. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
Planning for retirement has always been challenging, because retirees with limited 
financial resources face numerous risks, including out-living their money (longevity risk), 
investment losses (market risk), unexpected health expenses (health risk), the unforeseen 
needs of family members (family risk), and even retirement benefit cuts (policy risk).  
First, it is challenging to analyze these risks within a single framework, because they 
affect retirees through multiple dimensions, such as their planning horizons, the value of 
their investment holdings, unexpected expenditures, and income disruptions.  It is also 
unclear whether retirees perceive their risks accurately, because their beliefs about those 
risks often deviate from what the empirical data show.  
 
This paper develops a life cycle model of a typical retired household facing the five 
categories of risk discussed above.  To perform the parallel analyses from both the 
objective and subjective perspectives, this study first applies the objective risk 
distributions from the empirical data, such as life tables and historical market returns, 
and, in a second step, estimates the subjective risk distributions from the survey data in 
the HRS.  Using the method of utility-equivalent wealth, the parallel analyses quantify 
the five risks to generate two rankings – one for objective and one for subjective risk.  
The biggest risk in the objective ranking is longevity risk, followed by health risk and 
market risk.  Policy risk ranks at the bottom, because Social Security reform is unlikely to 
have a significant impact on people who have already retired. At the top of the subjective 
ranking is market risk, which reflects retirees’ exaggerated assessments of market 
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volatility.  Perceived longevity risk and health risk rank lower, because retirees are 
pessimistic about their survival probabilities and often underestimate their health costs in 
late life.  The results highlight the importance of educating retirees on the sources of their 
retirement risks.  Moreover, this paper provides a unique angle to encourage the use of 
annuities to hedge both the longevity risk and market risk and to emphasize the demand 
for long-term care insurance to cover the risk of high medical costs in late life.  
 
This paper provides three possible avenues for future research.  First, this model 
estimates the risks for the typical retired household.  The model and methodology could 
also be applied to various household types to obtain a comprehensive picture of the 
perception gap based on socioeconomic status and other demographics.  Second, the risks 
were independent  in this model but that is not the reality. For example, mortality risk is 
highly correlated with health status, which determines the risk of large medical 
expenditure.  It is therefore important to explore the interactions between different 
sources of risk and how these interactions complicate the task of retirement planning.  
Finally, more work needs to be done to improve the estimation of the subjective risk 
distributions.  For example, which type of distribution would best represent the risk 
expectations in people’s minds?  How can the estimation of the rounding standard be 
improved using the survey data?  And could a learning paradigm (Athey, 2018) be 
embedded in the analysis that would allow retirees’ expectations and resulting decision-
making to evolve as they experience real-life risks?   	 	
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APPENDIX 
Table A - 1. Current-Law Scheduled Benefits and Replacement Rates for Hypothetical 
Retired Workers in their First Year of Benefit Receipt at Age 65. 
Year of birth Year attain age 65 Wage-indexed 
2019 dollars 
Percent of career 
average earnings 
Scaled very low earnings: (career-average earnings for 2018 equal $12,949) 
1953 2018          $9,307 71.1 
1954 2019 9,518 73.5 
1955 2020 9,431 73.3 
1956 2021 9,092 70.5 
1957 2022 8,904 68.9 
Scaled low earnings: (career-average earnings for 2018 equal $23,308) 
1953 2018 12,183 51.7 
1954 2019 12,451 53.4 
1955 2020 12,348 53.3 
1956 2021 11,908 51.3 
1957 2022 11,657 50.1 
Scaled medium earnings: (career-average earnings for 2018 equal $51,795) 
1953 2018 20,076 38.4 
1954 2019 20,538 39.7 
1955 2020 20,355 39.6 
1956 2021 19,627 38.1 
1957 2022 19,222 37.2 
Scaled high earnings: (career-average earnings for 2018 equal $82,872) 
1953 2018 26,605 31.8 
1954 2019 27,208 32.8 
1955 2020 26,971 32.8 
1956 2021 25,993 31.5 
1957 2022 25,447 30.8 
Steady maximum earnings: (career-average earnings for 2018 equal $127,061) 
1953 2018 32,385 25.3 
1954 2019 33,134 26.1 
1955 2020 32,875 26.0 
1956 2021 31,721 25.0 
1957 2022 31,069 24.4 
Source: Clingman, Burkhalter, and Chaplain (2019). 
Note: Average of highest 35 years of wage-indexed earnings through the year prior to retirement. The value 
is for retirement in 2019. Thus, the annual earnings used for this average are wage-indexed to 2018. The 
result is based on intermediate assumptions of the 2019 OASDI Trustees Report. 
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Table A - 2. Family Transfer over Two-year Period, by Transfer Types. 
Panel A. Total transfer (net) 
Age 
All households Among households who made family transfer 
Samples Made transfers Samples Mean P50 P75 P90 P95 
50-64 7,784 52.6% 3,890 $13,195 $3,400 $10,000 $30,000 $57,622 
65-74 4,713 42.8 1,918 9,580 3,000 10,000 22,651 38,000 
75-84 3,973 34.0 1,302 11,684 2,800 10,000 25,000 50,000 
85+ 1,325 28.3 387 9,261 2,000 10,200 33,500 58,736 
Total 17,795 45.6 7,497 11,901 3,000 10,000 27,000 50,000 
 
Panel B. Transfer to children 
Age 
All households Among households who made family transfer 
Samples Made transfers Samples Mean P50 P75 P90 P95 
50-64 6,908 47.7% 2,899 $15,719 $4,000 $12,500 $33,000 $68,000 
65-74 4,377 39.1 1,616 10,377 3,700 10,000 24,000 37,977 
75-84 3,733 32.6 1,147 13,294 3,000 10,000 25,000 50,000 
85+ 1,240 28.2 359 10,940 1,500 10,000 31,000 60,000 
Total 16,258 41.7 6,021 13,760 3,700 11,500 30,000 55,000 
 
Panel C. Transfer to parents 
Age 
All households Among households who made family transfer 
Samples Made transfers Samples Mean P50 P75 P90 P95 
50-64 7,784 11.8% 1,078 $3,157 $2,000 $4,000 $7,000 $12,000 
65-74 4,713 5.1 215 4,247 1,900 5,000 10,000 12,400 
75-84 3,973 0.7 32 4,148 2,800 8,000 10,000 15,000 
85+ 1,325 0.1 2 845 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Total 17,795 7.6 1,327 3,387 2,000 4,000 8,000 12,000 
 
Panel D. Transfer to relatives 
Age 
All households Among households who made family transfer 
Samples Made transfers Samples Mean P50 P75 P90 P95 
50-64 7,654 12.6% 907 $4,506 $2,000 $4,000 $10,000 $20,000 
65-74 4,662 11.3% 447 4,786 $1,500 $3,000 $8,000 $10,000 
75-84 3,930 7.2 226 5,429 $1,500 $4,000 $10,000 $25,000 
85+ 1,307 7.8 82 4,013 $1,000 $3,000 $12,000 $20,000 
Total 17,553 11.1 1,662 4,659 $1,800 $4,000 $10,000 $20,000 
 
Panel E. Transfer from children 
Age All households Among households who made family transfer 
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Samples Made transfers Samples Mean P50 P75 P90 P95 
50-64 6,930 5.1% 479 $3,492 $1,900 $4,000 $7,000 $16,000 
65-74 4,391 4.8 249 4,381 2,000 4,000 8,000 15,500 
75-84 3,762 6.2 262 5,972 2,000 5,000 10,000 20,000 
85+ 1,245 7.1 95 6,305 2,500 5,000 12,000 28,000 
Total 16,328 5.3 1,085 4,392 2,000 4,000 8,500 18,960 
 
Panel F. Transfer from relatives 
Age 
All households Among households who made family transfer 
Samples Made transfers Samples Mean P50 P75 P90 P95 
50-64 7,661 4.7% 331 $9,939 $2,500 $6,000 $20,000 $50,000 
65-74 4,663 1.9 80 7,212 2,000 5,500 10,000 25,000 
75-84 3,937 1.5 56 7,646 1,500 5,000 14,000 20,000 
85+ 1,311 2.6 25 5,070 1,000 4,300 12,000 30,000 
Total 17,572 3.3 492 9,139 2,000 5,500 15,000 30,000 
 
Source: HRS 2014. 
Note: In 2014 dollars. 
 
Table A - 3. The Expectation Questions in the HRS.  
Risk type  Wording in the survey 
Longevity 
Risk 
What is the percent chance that you will live to be 
[75/80/85/90/95/100] or more? 
Market Risk By next year at this time, what is the percent chance that mutual fund 
shares invested in blue chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average will be worth more than they are today? 
Market Risk By next year at this time, what is the percent chance that mutual fund 
shares invested in blue chip stocks (like those in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average) will have [gained/ fallen] in value by more than 
20 percent compared to what they are worth today? 
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Market Risk What do you think is the percent chance that by next year at this time 
your home will be worth [more/less] than it is today? 
Market Risk By this time next year, what is the percent chance that the value of 
your home will have [fallen/gained] in value by more than 
[10/20/30/40] percent compared to what it is worth today? 
Health Risk What are the chances that you will spend out-of-pocket for your own 
medical expenses more than [$500/$1,500/$3,000/$8,000] during the 
coming year? 
Health Risk What is the percent chance that you will move to a nursing home in 
the next five years? 
Policy Risk what do you think is the percent chance that the benefits you yourself 
are receiving from Social Security will be cut some time over the next 
10 years? 
Policy Risk what do you think is the percent chance that over the next 10 years 
there will be changes to Social Security that will reduce your future 
benefits compared to what you would get under the current system? 
Source: HRS 2010 – 2016. 
 
  
	 72	
Table A - 4. Expectation of Housing Price Change in the Next Year. 
 
Loss 
40% 
more 
Loss 
30% 
more 
Loss 
20% 
more 
Loss 
10% 
more 
Worth 
more 
Gain 
10% 
more 
Gain 
20% 
more 
Gain 
30% 
more 
Gain 
40% 
more 
All 15.8% 18.0% 20.0% 22.0% 52.6% 35.4% 27.1% 22.8% 19.1% 
By gender: 
Men 13.2 14.1 16.8 19.7 53.7 33.6 23.1 19.0 16.1 
Women 18.1 21.7 23.1 23.9 51.5 37.2 30.6 26.6 22.1 
By year: 
2012 15.2 19.2 21.4 23.1 49.2 32.0 26.6 21.1 18.0 
2014 14.6 15.7 19.1 18.8 47.8 35.3 27.0 23.3 20.0 
2016 17.6 19.2 19.4 24.4 50.0 37.8 27.5 24.0 19.0 
By age: 
65-69 14.6 16.5 20.3 22.9 53.7 37.2 26.6 22.5 18.4 
70-74 15.6 18.9 20.1 21.8 51.5 34.8 26.8 23.9 18.5 
75-79 16.2 18.4 18.9 21.3 51.8 38.5 28.5 23.2 20.1 
80-84 14.5 19.6 19.6 21.2 53.3 30.6 28.0 22.2 21.7 
85+ 20.8 17.9 20.9 22.1 52.1 31.0 25.6 21.2 18.4 
Source: HRS 2012 - 2016. 
Table A - 5.  Expectation of Medical Spending in Next Year. 
  Spend 
$1500+ 
Spend 
$3000+ 
Spend 
$8000+ 
All 42.7% 23.6% 10.8% 
By gender: 
Men 44.0 24.2 10.6 
Women 41.6 23.1 11.0 
By year: 
2010 40.8 22.0   9.8 
2012 43.0 23.7 10.7 
2014 42.4 23.5 11.0 
2016 44.2 24.8 11.7 
By age: 
65-69 44.1 24.7 11.1 
70-74 45.0 24.7 11.4 
75-79 41.4 22.5 10.2 
80-84 40.2 22.0 10.1 
85+ 37.3 20.8 10.3 
Source: HRS 2010 - 2016. 
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Table A - 6. Expectation of Family Transfers $5,000 or more in Next 10 Years. 
 Samples Mean Std 
All 46,439 34.8% 37.5% 
By gender: 
Men 19,066 41.5 38.8 
Women 27,373 29.5 35.7 
By year: 
2002 14,446 34.4 37.6 
2004 16,642 35.1 37.5 
2006 15,351 34.7 37.6 
By age: 
65-74 16,092 30.8 36.1 
75-84 9,005 26.5 36.1 
85+ 2,666 22.5 35.4 
Source: HRS 2002-2006 
 
 
Table A - 7. Expectation of Social Security Benefit Reduction in Next 10 Years. 
 Samples Mean Std 
All 48,966 43.3% 31.0% 
By gender: 
Men 20,703 41.2 31.5 
Women 28,263 44.9 30.6 
By year: 
2006 8,056 38.8 29.5 
2008 8,171 43.8 29.6 
2010 8,293 51.6 31.7 
2012 8,121 49.6 31.2 
2014 8,299 38.8 30.6 
2016 8,026 38.2 30.3 
By age: 
65-69 12,475 44.4 30.8 
70-74 13,144 43.2 30.7 
75-79 10,962 42.7 30.9 
80-84 7,057 42.0 31.7 
85+ 5,328 42.6 31.9 
Source: HRS 2006-2016. 
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Table A - 8. United States Life Table Functions for Cohort born in 1955.  
Panel A: Male 
x q(x) l(x) d(x) L(x) T(x) e(x) 
0 0.029631 100000 2963 97359 7376073 73.76 
1 0.001886 97037 183 96945 7278714 75.01 
2 0.001174 96854 114 96797 7181768 74.15 
3 0.000912 96740 88 96696 7084971 73.24 
4 0.000740 96652 71 96616 6988275 72.30 
5 0.000666 96580 64 96548 6891659 71.36 
6 0.000564 96516 54 96489 6795111 70.40 
7 0.000512 96462 49 96437 6698622 69.44 
8 0.000471 96412 45 96389 6602185 68.48 
9 0.000419 96367 40 96347 6505796 67.51 
10 0.000374 96326 36 96308 6409450 66.54 
11 0.000371 96290 36 96272 6313141 65.56 
12 0.000433 96255 42 96234 6216869 64.59 
13 0.000612 96213 59 96184 6120635 63.62 
14 0.000875 96154 84 96112 6024451 62.65 
15 0.001128 96070 108 96016 5928339 61.71 
16 0.001402 95962 135 95894 5832324 60.78 
17 0.001646 95827 158 95748 5736429 59.86 
18 0.001837 95669 176 95582 5640681 58.96 
19 0.001867 95494 178 95405 5545099 58.07 
20 0.001929 95315 184 95224 5449695 57.18 
21 0.001941 95132 185 95039 5354471 56.28 
22 0.002024 94947 192 94851 5259432 55.39 
23 0.002038 94755 193 94658 5164581 54.50 
24 0.002033 94562 192 94466 5069923 53.62 
25 0.002014 94369 190 94274 4975457 52.72 
26 0.001910 94179 180 94089 4881183 51.83 
27 0.001732 94000 163 93918 4787094 50.93 
28 0.001667 93837 156 93759 4693176 50.01 
29 0.001697 93680 159 93601 4599417 49.10 
30 0.001800 93521 168 93437 4505816 48.18 
31 0.002066 93353 193 93257 4412379 47.27 
32 0.002143 93160 200 93060 4319123 46.36 
33 0.002287 92960 213 92854 4226062 45.46 
34 0.002440 92748 226 92635 4133208 44.56 
35 0.002555 92522 236 92403 4040573 43.67 
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36 0.002695 92285 249 92161 3948170 42.78 
37 0.002821 92036 260 91907 3856009 41.90 
38 0.003021 91777 277 91638 3764102 41.01 
39 0.003214 91500 294 91353 3672464 40.14 
40 0.003401 91206 310 91050 3581112 39.26 
41 0.003265 90895 297 90747 3490061 38.40 
42 0.003133 90599 284 90457 3399314 37.52 
43 0.003299 90315 298 90166 3308858 36.64 
44 0.003550 90017 320 89857 3218692 35.76 
45 0.003903 89697 350 89522 3128835 34.88 
46 0.004278 89347 382 89156 3039313 34.02 
47 0.004560 88965 406 88762 2950157 33.16 
48 0.004937 88559 437 88341 2861394 32.31 
49 0.005210 88122 459 87893 2773054 31.47 
50 0.005719 87663 501 87412 2685161 30.63 
51 0.006144 87162 536 86894 2597749 29.80 
52 0.006447 86626 558 86347 2510855 28.98 
53 0.006868 86068 591 85772 2424508 28.17 
54 0.007347 85476 628 85162 2338736 27.36 
55 0.007806 84848 662 84517 2253574 26.56 
56 0.008502 84186 716 83828 2169056 25.76 
57 0.009124 83470 762 83090 2085228 24.98 
58 0.009801 82709 811 82304 2002138 24.21 
59 0.010588 81898 867 81465 1919835 23.44 
60 0.011468 81031 929 80566 1838370 22.69 
61 0.012434 80102 996 79604 1757803 21.94 
62 0.012967 79106 1026 78593 1678200 21.21 
63 0.013770 78080 1075 77542 1599607 20.49 
64 0.014474 77005 1115 76448 1522064 19.77 
65 0.015217 75890 1155 75313 1445617 19.05 
66 0.016070 74735 1201 74135 1370304 18.34 
67 0.017043 73535 1253 72908 1296169 17.63 
68 0.018166 72281 1313 71625 1223261 16.92 
69 0.019448 70968 1380 70278 1151636 16.23 
70 0.020942 69588 1457 68859 1081358 15.54 
71 0.022617 68131 1541 67360 1012499 14.86 
72 0.024404 66590 1625 65777 945138 14.19 
73 0.026289 64965 1708 64111 879361 13.54 
74 0.028349 63257 1793 62360 815250 12.89 
75 0.030824 61464 1895 60516 752890 12.25 
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76 0.033712 59569 2008 58565 692374 11.62 
77 0.036788 57561 2118 56502 633809 11.01 
78 0.039991 55443 2217 54335 577307 10.41 
79 0.043479 53226 2314 52069 522972 9.83 
80 0.047440 50912 2415 49704 470903 9.25 
81 0.052183 48497 2531 47231 421199 8.69 
82 0.057988 45966 2665 44633 373967 8.14 
83 0.065133 43300 2820 41890 329334 7.61 
84 0.073579 40480 2978 38991 287444 7.10 
85 0.083119 37502 3117 35943 248453 6.63 
86 0.093521 34385 3216 32777 212510 6.18 
87 0.104612 31169 3261 29539 179733 5.77 
88 0.116313 27908 3246 26285 150195 5.38 
89 0.128659 24662 3173 23076 123909 5.02 
90 0.141724 21489 3046 19966 100834 4.69 
91 0.155618 18444 2870 17009 80867 4.38 
92 0.170464 15573 2655 14246 63859 4.10 
93 0.186378 12919 2408 11715 49613 3.84 
94 0.203472 10511 2139 9442 37898 3.61 
95 0.220223 8372 1844 7450 28456 3.40 
96 0.236283 6529 1543 5757 21006 3.22 
97 0.251288 4986 1253 4359 15249 3.06 
98 0.264876 3733 989 3239 10889 2.92 
99 0.276698 2744 759 2365 7650 2.79 
100 0.289052 1985 574 1698 5286 2.66 
101 0.301963 1411 426 1198 3588 2.54 
102 0.315455 985 311 830 2390 2.43 
103 0.329557 674 222 563 1560 2.31 
104 0.344294 452 156 374 997 2.20 
105 0.359696 296 107 243 623 2.10 
106 0.375793 190 71 154 379 2.00 
107 0.392617 118 47 95 225 1.90 
108 0.410202 72 30 57 130 1.81 
109 0.428580 42 18 33 73 1.72 
110 0.447790 24 11 19 40 1.63 
111 0.467868 13 6 10 21 1.55 
112 0.488855 7 3 5 10 1.46 
113 0.510791 4 2 3 5 1.39 
114 0.533720 2 1 1 2 1.31 
115 0.557688 1 0 1 1 1.24 
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116 0.582742 0 0 0 0 1.17 
117 0.608930 0 0 0 0 1.10 
118 0.636306 0 0 0 0 1.04 
119 0.664924 0 0 0 0 0.97 
 
Panel B: Female 
x q(x) l(x) d(x) L(x) T(x) e(x) 
0 0.023076 100000 2308 97970 7997073 79.97 
1 0.001718 97692 168 97608 7899103 80.86 
2 0.000964 97525 94 97478 7801495 80.00 
3 0.000761 97431 74 97394 7704017 79.07 
4 0.000623 97356 61 97326 7606624 78.13 
5 0.000522 97296 51 97270 7509297 77.18 
6 0.000427 97245 42 97224 7412027 76.22 
7 0.000389 97203 38 97184 7314803 75.25 
8 0.000331 97166 32 97149 7217618 74.28 
9 0.000300 97133 29 97119 7120469 73.31 
10 0.000267 97104 26 97091 7023350 72.33 
11 0.000261 97078 25 97066 6926259 71.35 
12 0.000272 97053 26 97040 6829193 70.37 
13 0.000322 97027 31 97011 6732154 69.38 
14 0.000415 96995 40 96975 6635143 68.41 
15 0.000486 96955 47 96932 6538168 67.44 
16 0.000586 96908 57 96880 6441236 66.47 
17 0.000637 96851 62 96820 6344357 65.51 
18 0.000671 96790 65 96757 6247536 64.55 
19 0.000626 96725 61 96694 6150779 63.59 
20 0.000631 96664 61 96634 6054085 62.63 
21 0.000623 96603 60 96573 5957451 61.67 
22 0.000641 96543 62 96512 5860878 60.71 
23 0.000662 96481 64 96449 5764366 59.75 
24 0.000641 96417 62 96386 5667917 58.79 
25 0.000646 96355 62 96324 5571531 57.82 
26 0.000654 96293 63 96261 5475207 56.86 
27 0.000627 96230 60 96200 5378946 55.90 
28 0.000640 96170 62 96139 5282746 54.93 
29 0.000652 96108 63 96077 5186607 53.97 
30 0.000700 96045 67 96012 5090530 53.00 
31 0.000778 95978 75 95941 4994519 52.04 
32 0.000841 95903 81 95863 4898578 51.08 
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33 0.000883 95823 85 95780 4802715 50.12 
34 0.000948 95738 91 95693 4706934 49.16 
35 0.001002 95647 96 95599 4611242 48.21 
36 0.001093 95552 104 95499 4515642 47.26 
37 0.001170 95447 112 95391 4420143 46.31 
38 0.001285 95335 123 95274 4324752 45.36 
39 0.001391 95213 132 95147 4229478 44.42 
40 0.001527 95080 145 95008 4134331 43.48 
41 0.001598 94935 152 94859 4039323 42.55 
42 0.001690 94783 160 94703 3944464 41.62 
43 0.001806 94623 171 94538 3849760 40.69 
44 0.001964 94452 185 94360 3755222 39.76 
45 0.002145 94267 202 94166 3660863 38.84 
46 0.002402 94065 226 93952 3566697 37.92 
47 0.002633 93839 247 93715 3472745 37.01 
48 0.002825 93592 264 93460 3379030 36.10 
49 0.002996 93327 280 93188 3285570 35.20 
50 0.003286 93048 306 92895 3192383 34.31 
51 0.003516 92742 326 92579 3099488 33.42 
52 0.003745 92416 346 92243 3006909 32.54 
53 0.004000 92070 368 91886 2914666 31.66 
54 0.004296 91701 394 91504 2822781 30.78 
55 0.004520 91307 413 91101 2731276 29.91 
56 0.004926 90895 448 90671 2640175 29.05 
57 0.005344 90447 483 90205 2549504 28.19 
58 0.005759 89964 518 89705 2459299 27.34 
59 0.006266 89446 560 89165 2369594 26.49 
60 0.006735 88885 599 88586 2280429 25.66 
61 0.007358 88286 650 87962 2191843 24.83 
62 0.007504 87637 658 87308 2103881 24.01 
63 0.008036 86979 699 86630 2016573 23.18 
64 0.008615 86280 743 85909 1929944 22.37 
65 0.009285 85537 794 85140 1844035 21.56 
66 0.010041 84743 851 84317 1758895 20.76 
67 0.010879 83892 913 83435 1674578 19.96 
68 0.011795 82979 979 82490 1591142 19.18 
69 0.012807 82000 1050 81475 1508653 18.40 
70 0.014005 80950 1134 80383 1427177 17.63 
71 0.015371 79817 1227 79203 1346794 16.87 
72 0.016805 78590 1321 77929 1267591 16.13 
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73 0.018288 77269 1413 76562 1189661 15.40 
74 0.019898 75856 1509 75101 1113099 14.67 
75 0.021817 74347 1622 73536 1037998 13.96 
76 0.024092 72725 1752 71848 964462 13.26 
77 0.026614 70972 1889 70028 892614 12.58 
78 0.029366 69084 2029 68069 822586 11.91 
79 0.032429 67055 2175 65968 754517 11.25 
80 0.035959 64880 2333 63714 688549 10.61 
81 0.040081 62547 2507 61294 624835 9.99 
82 0.044876 60040 2694 58693 563541 9.39 
83 0.050495 57346 2896 55898 504848 8.80 
84 0.057014 54450 3104 52898 448950 8.25 
85 0.064428 51346 3308 49692 396052 7.71 
86 0.072694 48038 3492 46292 346360 7.21 
87 0.081757 44546 3642 42725 300069 6.74 
88 0.091586 40904 3746 39031 257344 6.29 
89 0.102186 37158 3797 35259 218313 5.88 
90 0.113584 33361 3789 31466 183054 5.49 
91 0.125823 29571 3721 27711 151588 5.13 
92 0.138960 25851 3592 24054 123877 4.79 
93 0.153050 22258 3407 20555 99823 4.48 
94 0.168151 18852 3170 17267 79268 4.20 
95 0.183270 15682 2874 14245 62001 3.95 
96 0.198142 12808 2538 11539 47756 3.73 
97 0.212480 10270 2182 9179 36217 3.53 
98 0.225985 8088 1828 7174 27038 3.34 
99 0.238357 6260 1492 5514 19864 3.17 
100 0.251410 4768 1199 4169 14350 3.01 
101 0.265183 3569 947 3096 10182 2.85 
102 0.279715 2623 734 2256 7086 2.70 
103 0.295049 1889 557 1610 4830 2.56 
104 0.311228 1332 414 1125 3219 2.42 
105 0.328300 917 301 767 2095 2.28 
106 0.346315 616 213 509 1328 2.16 
107 0.365324 403 147 329 819 2.03 
108 0.385383 256 99 206 490 1.92 
109 0.406550 157 64 125 283 1.80 
110 0.428887 93 40 73 158 1.69 
111 0.452459 53 24 41 85 1.59 
112 0.477334 29 14 22 44 1.49 
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113 0.503585 15 8 11 21 1.40 
114 0.531289 8 4 6 10 1.31 
115 0.557688 4 2 3 4 1.24 
116 0.582742 2 1 1 2 1.17 
117 0.608930 1 0 0 1 1.10 
118 0.636306 0 0 0 0 1.04 
119 0.664924 0 0 0 0 0.97 
Source: U.S. Social Security Administration. 2019. “The Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the 
Federal Old- Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds.” 
Note:  Based on the Alternative 2 mortality probabilities used in the 2019 Trustees Report. 
 
 
Table A - 9. Subjective Mortality Model Estimation. 
 
Coefficient Std 
Male 0.121 (0.031) 
Black -0.004 (0.042) 
Hispanic 0.311 (0.062) 
High school -0.313 (0.036) 
College -0.599 (0.037) 
Ever smoked 0.182 (0.035) 
Constant -5.133 (0.081) 𝛾 0.115 (0.004) 𝜍$# 1.096 (0.042) 
Source: Bissonnette et al. (2017) 
 
 
Table A - 10. Subjective Housing Return Estimation by Distribution Types, for Men.   
 
Rankin
g 
Distribution Name Mean Std Loss 
1 Double Weibull  1.023738 0.559269 0.01070
5 
2 Double Gamma  1.024124 0.463452 0.01170
6 
3 Log Double Exponential (Log-Laplace)  1.046921 0.344028 0.01742
7 
4 Laplace (Double Exponential, Bilateral 
Exponential)  
1.033428 0.338347 0.01773
1 
5 Hyperbolic Secant  1.035402 0.308437 0.02462
3 
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6 Von Mises  1.035695 0.280165 0.02647
6 
7 Mielke’s Beta-Kappa  1.040389 0.296107 0.02778
2 
8 Burr 1.040384 0.296105 0.02778
2 
9 Fisk (Log Logistic)  1.040663 0.294630 0.02795
5 
10 Generalized Logistic  1.035555 0.294055 0.02805
8 
11 Logistic 1.035931 0.293930 0.02805
9 
12 Exponentiated Weibull 1.037776 0.275568 0.03251
3 
13 Power Log Normal 1.037474 0.275473 0.03269
6 
14 Reciprocal Inverse Gaussian  1.039070 0.275084 0.03273
0 
15 Inverted Gamma 1.038295 0.275085 0.03285
7 
16 Log Normal 1.038158 0.275059 0.03285
9 
17 Johnson SB 1.038112 0.275053 0.03286
0 
18 Fatigue Life (Birnbaum-Saunders) 1.038033 0.275043 0.03286
1 
19 Gamma 1.037898 0.275025 0.03286
3 
20 Chi-squared 1.037909 0.275026 0.03286
3 
21 Power Normal 1.035098 0.275233 0.03286
6 
22 Generalized Gamma 1.037785 0.274975 0.03287
7 
23 Beta Prime 1.039807 0.275328 0.03288
1 
24 Rice 1.036388 0.274967 0.03288
7 
25 Normal 1.036384 0.274966 0.03288
7 
26 Log Gamma 1.036280 0.274967 0.03289
1 
27 Beta 1.037777 0.274928 0.03289
1 
28 Inverse Normal (Inverse Gaussian) 1.041149 0.275551 0.03295
4 
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29 Gauss Hypergeometric 1.037651 0.274421 0.03305
0 
30 Generalized Extreme Value 1.041311 0.270896 0.03416
7 
31 Weibull Minimum Extreme Value 1.033608 0.270673 0.03474
4 
32 Maxwell 1.051646 0.277288 0.03738
8 
33 Cosine 1.036534 0.263967 0.03786
6 
34 Gumbel (Log Weibull, Fisher-Tippetts, 
Type I Extreme Value) 
1.071183 0.304547 0.03892
2 
35 Inverted Weibull 1.071481 0.305158 0.03898
7 
36 Exponential Power 1.030982 0.264326 0.03995
7 
37 Anglit 1.036439 0.260470 0.04180
0 
38 Gumbel Left-skewed 1.002819 0.308583 0.04184
4 
39 Rayleigh 1.057003 0.281824 0.04198
1 
40 Generalized Exponential 1.057045 0.281777 0.04199
3 
41 KStwo 1.066515 0.288116 0.04234
9 
42 Semicircular 1.035914 0.259532 0.04851
2 
43 Generalized Half-Logistic  1.033517 0.263782 0.05144
0 
44 Power-function 1.031632 0.263854 0.05714
0 
45 Half Normal 1.073635 0.251620 0.05726
3 
46 Folded Normal 1.073636 0.251621 0.05726
3 
47 Gompertz (Truncated Gumbel) 1.069682 0.242163 0.05813
8 
48 Generalized Pareto 1.047993 0.246542 0.05860
0 
49 Truncated Exponential 1.046373 0.243580 0.06085
8 
50 Bradford 1.045949 0.242809 0.06128
5 
51 Ksone 1.032440 0.266399 0.06197
6 
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52 Uniform 1.044617 0.242229 0.06311
6 
53 Half-Logistic 1.091151 0.345673 0.06380
9 
54 Exponential 1.107861 0.340755 0.06452
2 
55 Pareto Second Kind (Lomax) 1.107861 0.340755 0.06452
2 
56 Wald 1.139846 0.428259 0.06556
3 
57 Gilbrat 1.167066 0.558812 0.06700
0 
58 Noncentral Chi-squared 1.117906 0.306401 0.06777
2 
59 Pareto 1.125868 0.436739 0.08471
8 
60 Arcsine 1.022925 0.107593 0.18107
2 
61 R-distribution 0.362800 0.792577 0.60974
8 
Source: HRS 2012-2016 and author’s calculation. 
 
Table A - 11. Objective Health Model Estimation.   
Panel A: Dynamics 
Variable Parameter Estimate Std 
Autocorrelation, 
persistent part 
𝜂 0.922 (0.010) 
Innovation variance, 
persistent part 
𝜎:,3-046  0.050 (0.008) 
Innovation variance, 
transitory part 
𝜎:,!0126  0.665 (0.014) 
 
Panel B: Mean and variance of the log of medical expenses  
Male Female 
Age 𝑡 𝑚(𝑡) 𝜎(𝑡) 𝑚(𝑡) 𝜎(𝑡) 
70 5.93657 1.37624 5.94819 1.25083 
71 6.01512 1.39834 6.03638 1.28382 
72 6.08147 1.41515 6.11238 1.31064 
73 6.13728 1.42795 6.17783 1.33284 
74 6.18411 1.43783 6.23430 1.35169 
75 6.22343 1.44576 6.28327 1.36830 
76 6.25663 1.45262 6.32611 1.38362 
77 6.28503 1.45917 6.36415 1.39849 
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78 6.30981 1.46609 6.39858 1.41362 
79 6.33213 1.47400 6.43055 1.42964 
80 6.35301 1.48339 6.46107 1.44704 
81 6.37342 1.49469 6.49112 1.46625 
82 6.39420 1.50824 6.52154 1.48756 
83 6.41615 1.52427 6.55314 1.51121 
84 6.43994 1.54294 6.58658 1.53731 
85 6.46620 1.56431 6.62248 1.56589 
86 6.49542 1.58836 6.66134 1.59691 
87 6.52804 1.61498 6.70361 1.63024 
88 6.56440 1.64400 6.74961 1.66570 
89 6.60476 1.67520 6.79962 1.70306 
90 6.64927 1.70826 6.85377 1.74200 
91 6.69803 1.74287 6.91217 1.78222 
92 6.75100 1.77865 6.97479 1.82334 
93 6.80813 1.81518 7.04156 1.86499 
94 6.86919 1.85203 7.11227 1.90673 
95 6.93395 1.88875 7.18667 1.94815 
96 7.00202 1.92485 7.26439 1.98878 
97 7.07298 1.95985 7.34499 2.02817 
98 7.14628 1.99320 7.42793 2.06582 
99 7.22131 2.02438 7.51261 2.10123 
100 7.29736 2.05281 7.59830 2.13386 
101 7.37364 2.07791 7.68423 2.16318 
102 7.44925 2.09902 7.76949 2.18857 
Source: De Nardi et al. (2010) and author’s calculation.  
 
Table A - 12. Alternative Assumptions of Social Security Benefit Cut, for Single Men.   
Assumption Risk Value 
COLA change 0.1% 
FRA to 70 1.0 
25 percent cut 1.2 
Source: author’s calculation. 
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Figure A - 1. Subjective CDF of Housing Price Change, by Gender, Year, and Age. 
 
  
 
Source: HRS 2012-2016 and author’s calculation. 
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Figure A - 2. Estimated CDF of Housing Price Change using Subjective Data. 
 
 
Source: HRS 2012-2016 and author’s calculation. 
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Figure A - 3. Life Cycle Path for Single Men, by Different Values of Time Preference. 
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
Figure A - 4. Life Cycle Path for Single Men, by Different Values of Risk Aversion. 
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
Solving the Couple’s model 
In the full version of the model for married couples, the optimization problem is solved 
with the number of state variables, choice variables, and shock variables as 8 × 3 × 8.  
The state variables are: age 𝑡 = 65…119, total wealth 	𝑋!, housing value 𝐻!, retirement 
saving balance 𝐾!, permanent health shock level 𝑃.	for the head and 𝑃5 for the spouse, 
number of family members 𝑁 = 2 if the spouse still alive and 1 if dead, and the Social 
Security benefit adjustment status 𝐴 = 1 if no benefit change and less than 1 if the 
benefit cut happens.  Except three discrete variables, age 𝑡, binary 𝑁 and binary 𝐴, the 
rest are continuous ones and have to be discretized.  For the order of 𝑋, 𝐻, 𝐾, 𝑃. and 𝑃5, 
this paper uses a 1000 ×100 ×100 ×10 ×10 grid with a log-scale for numerical solutions.  
There are three choice variables at household level: consumption 𝐶!; withdrawal 𝐷! from 
a retirement savings account; and the share invested in risky assets 𝑆!.  The stochastic 
shocks considered in the couple’s model include stock return 𝑅!8#- , housing return 𝑅!8#. , 
the innovation of permanent health shock 𝜀!8#.,3-04 𝜀!8#5,3-04 for the head and the spouse, the 
innovation of transitory shock 𝜀!8#.,!012 𝜀!8#5,!012, family transfers 𝐹!8#, spousal mortality 𝑄!8#5  from the life table, and the Social Security policy change 𝛼!8#.  Except the last two 
which are binary shocks, the rest six of the eight shocks are all continuous.  Therefore, 
the expectation part of the objective function can be rewritten as multiple integral form 
with respect of those six continuous variables and are solved with multidimensional 
Gauss-Hermite Quadrature method, as describe later.  In order to attain the value 
function from the future period, this paper uses cubic-splines interpolation, a piecewise 
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cubic polynomial which is twice continuously differentiable.  To do that, the model is 
first solved in the last period 𝑡 = 119 and generates a value function (policy function) 
with eight state variables and the associated optimal utility value 𝑉##<.  This gives the 
mapping system at each of the 1000 ×100 ×100 ×10 ×10 ×2 ×2 grid point at age 119.  
In the backward induction process for current age 𝑡, the future value of  𝑉!8# in the 
objective function is interpolated among the grid points by the state variables at age 𝑡 +1	calculated using the realized shocks and the mapping of 𝑉!8# that have been solved.  
This paper uses the cubic splines interpolation class in the SciPy package for Python with 
the “natural” type (the second derivative at curve ends are zero).  The backward induction 
uses Multiprocessing package for Python to do parallel computing on Boston College’s 
Linux Cluster server.  The running time to solve the couple’s model is about 25 hours. 
 
Gauss-Hermite Quadrature 
The Gauss-Hermite quadrature method provides a set of integration modes {𝜖=}=>#,…,@ and 
weights {𝜔=}=>#,…,@ for approximation of the integral in the expectation calculation.  To 
approximate a multidimensional integral by multidimensional Gauss-Hermite quadrature 
rule:   
𝐸[𝐺(𝜖)] = 	u 𝐺(ℝ( 𝜖) ∗ 𝑤(𝜖) 𝑑𝜖 	≈ 	 y …@"="># y 𝜔="# …	𝜔=(B
@(
=(># ∗ 	𝐺(𝜖	#, … , 𝜖	B) 
where 𝜖	 ≡ (𝜖	#, … , 𝜖	B)C 	 ∈ 	ℝB is a vector of uncorrelated variables; {𝜔=&. }=&>#,…,@& and {𝜖=&. }=&>#,…,@&are weights and nodes in a dimension h derived from the unidimensional 
Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule, denoted by 𝑄(𝐽).  This paper uses a three-node rule 𝑄(3) 
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for the normal distribution shocks with nodes 𝜖!8#,# = 0, 𝜖!8#,6 = 𝜎76 , 𝜖!8#,7 = −	𝜎76  
and weights 𝜔!8#,# = 6√E7 , 𝜔!8#,6 = 𝜔!8#,7 	= √E&  .  See Chapter 7 in Handbook of 
Computational Economics (Volume 3 by Schmedders and Judd, 2013). 
 
